CA11: There was justification for ptf’s stop, so pretext question doesn’t get to jury

“The plaintiffs contend that the record contains evidence that could lead a jury to conclude that Officer Benton merely used the tag violation as a pretext for an otherwise unlawful stop. But Officer Benton’s subjective purpose for conducting the traffic stop is immaterial. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996); …. Under the reasonable suspicion standard, we need not guess at Officer Benton’s motivation for initiating the stop. We need only consider whether, given the totality of the circumstances, an objective and particularized basis for the stop existed. Brent, 247 F.3d at 1300. Here, one did.” He had reasonable suspicion. Bradley v. Benton, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 25755 (11th Cir. Aug. 26, 2021).

Defendant had standing to challenge the search of the house of the mother of his child where he frequently spent the night, and did on the night in question. “Deputy Lowe candidly admitted that without Cameron Tillman’s consent, the officers were not in possession of facts which would justify their entry into the home otherwise.” On the credibility of consent for the entry, the officers were. United States v. Mitchell, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161471 (D.S.D. July 6, 2021),* adopted, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160717 (D.S.D. Aug. 25, 2021).*

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