Nexus can be circumstantial. United States v. Simmons, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 4208 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 2025) (It suggests it’s limited to drug dealers, but it’s really not. Moreover, it’s articulating what other courts think but don’t usually say.):
But a warrant to search a drug dealer’s home lies at the center of two “competing concerns.” United States v. Reed, 993 F.3d 441, 447 (6th Cir. 2021). On one side, though there may be probable cause to arrest, that does not “necessarily establish” probable cause to search that same suspect’s home. Id. On the other side, “probable cause is a practical and common-sensical standard” and common sense suggests that when an individual is a suspect of a crime, his home will “often” be a “likely place” for him to keep the means, fruits, and evidence of his crime. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But we have clarified this tension, particularly as it relates to drug traffickers. Even if no direct evidence ties drug dealing to a home, a nexus exists based on circumstantial evidence “if a suspect’s drug dealing is ‘ongoing’ at the time the police seek the warrant.” Id. at 448 (quoting United States v. Feagan, 472 F. App’x 382, 392 (6th Cir. 2012)); see United States v. Gunter, 551 F.3d 472, 481-82 (6th Cir. 2009); McCoy, 905 F.3d at 417-18.
This is the “continual-and-ongoing-operations theory.” McCoy, 905 F.3d at 418. Under that theory, when a drug dealer’s activity is regular and ongoing, it is more likely that his home will have evidence of that activity–supply, records, or monetary profits. Gunter, 551 F.3d at 481 (finding probable cause “[b]ecause the quantity of drugs and the repeated nature of the transactions make it reasonable to conclude that Gunter was engaged in ongoing drug trafficking, it was reasonable to infer that evidence of illegal activity would be found at Gunter’s residence”). And in drug cases, we have regularly upheld findings of probable cause under this likelihood “even when there is absolutely no indication of any wrongdoing occurring at that residence.” United States v. Sumlin, 956 F.3d 879, 886 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Goward, 188 F. App’x 355, 359-60 (6th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“[I]n both his affidavit and at the motion to exclude hearing, [the affiant] stated that in his years of experience and training that drug dealers kept narcotics, paraphernalia, and weapons at their residence. Accordingly, drug trafficking, which the affiant witnessed and is further substantiated from his experience and training, establishes a sufficient nexus to support a finding of probable cause to search the place where the drug trafficker presently lives.” (citations omitted)); see also United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969, 974-75 (6th Cir. 1998) (same).
Still a dealer’s status alone is not enough to meet this standard. Reed, 993 F.3d at 449. To support an allegation of ongoing drug dealing, the warrant affidavit must detail “recent, reliable evidence of drug activity” and the place to be searched should be the dealer’s current residence. McCoy, 905 F.3d at 418. One indicator of a dealer’s drug activity is the quantity of drugs he traffics. Gunter, 551 F.3d at 481. But that is not the only indicator. An affidavit can also show ongoing drug activity through the “repeated nature of the transactions,” id., “a defendant’s record of past drug convictions,” Sumlin, 956 F.3d at 886 (internal quotation marks omitted), “independent surveillance,” Jones, 159 F.3d at 974-75, “work with an international drug-trafficking operation,” Sheckles, 996 F.3d at 342, or witness accounts corroborated by an affiant’s “experience and training,” Goward, 188 F. App’x at 359-60. Ultimately, probable cause is a fact-intensive inquiry that, “at its core, depends on the totality of the circumstances,” so there is no single factor that predominates. Sanders, 106 F.4th 461 (internal quotation marks omitted). But we have said that if the affiant cannot confirm the dealer lives at the home or if the drug activity is not recent, the warrant is likely deficient. Id. at 466.
Sanders recently reiterated that “probable cause to search a known drug dealer’s residence is established where the dealer is engaged in continual and ongoing operations.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Sanders did not live at the relevant apartment, so the case was not resolved on a continual-and-ongoing-operations theory. Id. But after affirming the principle, we nonetheless found probable cause to search the apartment based on a series of controlled buys with a reliable informant. Id. at 463. Law enforcement watched Sanders leave the apartment, get into a car, drive to the buy location, briefly meet with the informant, then return to his car, and return to the apartment. Id. “This evidence alone [c]ould end the matter,” but the court then noted that “the search warrant sought not just drugs, but also the proceeds of drug trafficking.” Id. And it would be “fair for officers to assume” that Sanders took proceeds into the apartment. Id. So even if Sanders did not live in the apartment, its connection to his dealing provided a sufficient nexus to establish probable cause. Id.
A separate question relates to whether information from a confidential informant provides sufficient reliability to show probable cause. . . .
. . .
Even more, police observed controlled buys between Simmons and the informant. Simmons would conduct the buy, continue to another home (identified as his stash house), then leave that home, and return to his Weatherwood residence. This predictable pattern of activity led Stoddard to believe Simmons “maintain[ed] a base of operation” at the stash house but likely “generate[d] the expected paper trails” that could be found in a range of areas including “secret locations within the home[].”
