The search was reasonable when viewed objectively, and the superior court is reversed. “We have reviewed the video from the two officers’ body-worn cameras, which were admitted into evidence at the hearing on the motion. Viewed objectively, we see no violations of the Fourth Amendment. Officer Booth was permitted to order Ramirez ‘to exit the vehicle without any articulable justification.’ (See Hoyos, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 893.) Therefore, we reverse the dismissal order and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to deny Ramirez’s motion to suppress evidence.” People v. Ramirez, 2024 Cal. App. LEXIS 512 (4th Dist. Aug. 20, 2024). The DA, however, said stupid things in his brief:
But before we more fully discuss the search and seizure issues, there is another issue we need to address in this opinion: the respect attorneys owe to trial court judges when challenging their rulings on appeal.
“It is the duty of an attorney to do all of the following: ¶ To support the Constitution and laws of the United States and of this state. ¶ To maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subds. (a)–(b).) We note that the current oath taken by every attorney on admission to practice law includes the following promise: “‘As an officer of the court, I will strive to conduct myself at all times with dignity, courtesy and integrity.’” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.7.)
It is also a long-standing rule that an appellate brief “containing matter manifestly disrespectful toward the trial judge is to be deemed contempt of the appellate court.” (First Nat. Bank v. Superior Court (1909) 12 Cal.App. 335, 348 [107 P. 322].)
In the appellant’s opening brief, the district attorney argued: “The trial court here has fabricated a new requirement to vehicle detentions, and has done so in defiance of United States and California Supreme Court precedent.” (Italics added.) And in the reply brief, the district attorney argued, in part: “This fabricated legal theory was untenable as the justification for granting the suppression motion, and likewise cannot justify the denial of the instant appeal.” (Italics added.)
At oral argument, the district attorney’s deputy (not the author of the briefs) was challenged about the propriety of using the word “fabricated” when referring to the trial court’s ruling. The deputy theorized that the “purport” of his colleague’s written argument was that the trial court’s ruling “was inconsistent with or contrary to established precedent.” When pressed further, the deputy went on to say, “I’m certain that we didn’t intend to suggest that the court had bad faith in making its ruling.”
According to Merriam-Webster, the verb “fabricate” has essentially two meanings, one of which implies bad faith, and the other does not: 1) “to make up for the purpose of deception” as in “accused of fabricating evidence”; or 2) “to construct from [usually] standardized parts.” (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (11th ed. 2007) p. 447, col. 1.)
We accept the representation of the district attorney (through his deputy) that he did not intend to suggest that the trial court had acted in bad faith when making its ruling. Indeed, the prosecutor who appeared at the hearing on the motion (and authored the appellate briefs) was gracious and respectful to the trial court judge. However, the written assertions in the district attorney’s briefs that the trial court “fabricated” a legal theory are nonetheless subject to misinterpretation and are unacceptable.
We advise the district attorney in the future to be more cautious and consider his language more carefully when challenging a ruling of a trial court in an appellate brief, or he may be subject to sanctions. Words are to lawyers, as scalpels are to surgeons. They are tools to be used with precision.
