CA9: Ptf’s protestations of innocence at arrest doesn’t undermine this arrest warrant

“Farber’s § 1983 claims also fail because she has not shown an underlying constitutional violation. Her arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the arresting officers ‘had a good faith, reasonable belief that [Farber] was the subject of the warrant.’ Rivera v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 745 F.3d 384, 389 (9th Cir. 2014). The Texas court issued the warrant for Farber, and her identifying information and physical descriptors matched the warrant exactly. Farber’s protestations of innocence, without more, did not make the officers’ beliefs unreasonable. See id.” It all turned out that Farber was mistakenly indicted in Texas. Farber v. City of L.A., 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19597 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2024). (And that’s not the City of L.A.’s fault, either.)

Under either version of events offered by the parties about this search, it was justified and reasonable, and the motion to suppress is denied. United States v. Dowell, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138730 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 6, 2024).*

“Murphy was on probation rather than parole. In the context of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has noted that parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, as parole is just a variation on imprisonment while probation is meted out in addition to imprisonment, not in lieu of it. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006).” United States v. Campbell, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19532 n.2 (7th Cir. Aug. 5, 2024).*

This entry was posted in § 1983 / Bivens, Arrest or entry on arrest, Good faith exception, Probation / Parole search, Reasonable suspicion. Bookmark the permalink.

Comments are closed.