IN: Stolen vehicles in yard doesn’t support SW for their records, and no GFE

Defendant was suspected of stealing trailers, and they were seen at his house. This did not justify a search warrant for documents in his house. In addition, the good faith exception did not apply. Thomas v. State, 2025 Ind. App. LEXIS 145 (May 5, 2025):

P20 Although the truck may have been connected to the theft of the Translifts, we fail to see any connection between the truck and the residence sufficient to establish “a fair probability” that evidence related to the theft investigation would be found in the residence. Heuring, 140 N.E.3d at 273. The mere fact that a vehicle, suspected of involvement in a crime, is parked on a public street near a residence does not give law enforcement the authority to invade the privacy of that residence. The Fourth Amendment does not countenance such intrusions. See Figert, 686 N.E.2d at 830-31 (holding that drug dealing activity from two nearby trailers did not supply probable cause to search third trailer); United States v. Brown, 828 F.3d 375, 382-83 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that drug-sniffing dogs’ alert to vehicle did not alone establish probable cause to search the vehicle owner’s residence).

P21 The State argues that more than the mere presence of the truck provided probable cause to search the house. The State points out that the truck was parked near the gate to the fenced yard and that the construction equipment around the property demonstrated that the owner could have the specialized knowledge needed to operate the Translifts. But any vehicle parked near a residence will usually be parked near points of entry, and we fail to see the connection between unspecified construction equipment and the operation of the Translifts, which are used to transport mobile homes. Based on the circumstances here, we conclude that the magistrate lacked a substantial basis to find that probable cause supported the first search warrant.

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P25 … [W]e fail to see any connection between the theft investigation and the broad range of documents, safes, and miscellaneous construction equipment listed as items sought to be searched. We are especially concerned regarding law enforcement’s use of a template here to list certain of these items; the sought-for items listed in a search warrant should be particularized based on the facts known and reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom in each individual case. We are also concerned that, although this was a simple investigation regarding the theft of two Translifts, the search warrant did not even mention the Translifts as items sought to be searched. See Hester v. State, 551 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding search warrant invalid because it “fail[ed] to describe in any detail precisely what items were taken in the robberies”).

P26 The first search warrant is clearly overbroad as it gave law enforcement the discretion to rummage through all nooks and crannies in the residence whereas the only items reported stolen were car-sized Translifts. In other words, the search warrant was far from “as particular as [the] circumstances permit[ted].” Banks, 231 N.E.3d at 863. Thus, we conclude that the first search warrant was invalid.