CA7: Post search statement of promise for consent didn’t affect consent to search

“Marcure also asserts that an officer coerced his consent by promising him that no charges would be filed, but even if a statement like this can be coercive, the complaint states that the promise occurred ‘[a]fter the search was finished.’ The promise could not have affected his decision to consent. No other allegations could support a reasonable inference that his consent was coerced; thus, he does not state a claim of unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment.” Marcure v. Lynn, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 8993 (7th Cir. Apr. 16, 2025).

“In his brief on appeal, Martin does not challenge the fact that the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe there was a window tint violation, and also had at least reasonable suspicion to believe that Martin was transporting illegal drugs. … [¶] We hold that the officer permissibly stopped Martin’s car on the basis of his reasonable suspicion of a window tint violation, and permissibly asked routine questions related thereto for more than 5 minutes during which time he had relocated Martin out of the car and into a location less risky to the safety of the officer. Thereafter—after the expiration of 5 minutes and 50 seconds—the officer permissibly extended the duration of the stop to investigate his reasonable suspicion that Martin was transporting illegal drugs.” United States v. Martin, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9046 (11th Cir. Apr. 16, 2025).*

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