D.N.M.: Consent attenuated unreasonable search

Opening a box in defendant’s car was an unreasonable search, and it likely violated the Fourth Amendment. Defendant was later Mirandized and consented. After a thorough discussion of the caselaw, the court finds that the constitutional violation was slight [what about de minimis intrusions still being intrusions] and the court declines to suppress. United States v. Herrera, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91988 (D.N.M. Apr. 27, 2026)* [reasonable people could disagree]:

The deputies did not act with flagrant disregard for Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Though their search of the box’s interior crossed the line of a lawful search, that slip was small. There is no evidence that the deputies were acting in bad faith or intentionally performing a solely investigatory search. Deputy Zagorski’s testimony also indicates that he may have had greater latitude to open closed containers in February 2025 than he has now. It seems that the deputies were at most negligent. Strieff, 579 U.S. at 24. Moreover, and most importantly to this analysis, the deputies did not exploit the fruits of their search to pressure Defendant into acquiescing. Attenuation doctrine seeks to prevent officers from exploiting the fruits of their illegality. WongSun, 371 U.S. at 488. It does not demand “that all evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police.” Id. at 487-88. Deputy Madden confined his questions to whether Defendant knew about the sealed box. He never mentions that Deputies Zagorski and Marin saw its contents or that they smelled laundry detergent. While it is true that Deputy Zagorski would not have called Deputy Madden but for the illegal search, Defendant’s consent was offered without any knowledge of that search. Cf. New York v.Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 20 (1990). The Court therefore finds that Defendant voluntarily gave his consent and that it was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search.