OR: Cell phone warrant was sufficiently particular to prevent a general rummaging

For this cell phone search, “As explained above, however, the first and fourth search categories are sufficiently specific, and defendant conceded below that the third category is sufficiently specific. Further, the sixth category’s command to search for location information—as circumscribed by the limitations included in those categories, such as specific phone numbers, dates, and types of information—is sufficiently specific and does not authorize ‘undue rummaging.’ See Mansor II, 363 Ore. at 220 (without specificity, digital searches ‘raise the possibility of computer search warrants … sanctioning the undue rummaging that the particularity requirement was enacted to preclude’ …).” State v. Meyers, 338 Or. App. 59 (Feb. 20, 2025).

Sovereign citizen’s § 1983 case was essentially an appeal of state traffic convictions and was barred by Heck. Justice v. Moreau, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29551 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2025).*

The use of force question here is fact bound and not proper for summary judgment. Monroy v. Perez, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 3875 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 2025).*

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