N.D.Ill.: Carpenter did not signal SCOTUS’s abandonment of the third party doctrine

Carpenter did not signal SCOTUS’s abandonment of the third party doctrine to non-CSLI. United States v. Osadzinski, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141637 (N.D.Ill. July 29, 2021)*:

Defendant moves to suppress the evidence obtained from the § 2703(d) orders. In doing so, defendant makes three arguments: (1) the government’s application lacked specific and articulable facts; (2) the lack of a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment; and (3) the historical nature of the obtained information violates Carpenter. Essentially, defendant asks this court to extend the “narrow” holding of Carpenter to information other than cell-site location information (“CSLI”). Courts across the country have been faced with similar requests; almost all have denied them. See, e.g., United States v. Morel, 922 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2019) (“Carpenter did not announce a wholesale abandonment of the third-party doctrine”); United States v. Contreras, 905 F.3d 853, 857 (5th Cir. 2018) (noting that “the third-party doctrine continues to apply to ‘business records that might incidentally reveal location information,’ including…bank records” (quoting Carpenter)); United States v. Wellbeloved-Stone, 777 Fed. App’x 605, 607 (4th Cir. 2019) (“[defendant] cites no post-Carpenter authority extending Carpenter’s rationale to IP addresses or subscriber information”). The court declines to extend Carpenter’s reasoning to the information at issue.

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