Border search doctrine did not permit search of laptop computer without reasonable suspicion

A border stop at LAX led Customs to search a laptop computer without reasonable suspicion. Such a search is highly invasive and must be based on reasonable suspicion. Search suppressed. United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999 (C.D. Cal. October 2, 2006):

The Supreme Court recognized in Flores-Montano that highly intrusive searches of persons implicate dignity and privacy interests. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152. Likewise, opening and viewing confidential computer files implicates dignity and privacy interests. Indeed; some may value the sanctity of private thoughts memorialized on a data storage device above physical privacy. See United States v. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d 709, 716 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that “government intrusions into the mind–specifically those that would cause fear or apprehension in a reasonable person–are no less deserving of Fourth Amendment scrutiny than intrusions that are physical in nature”), rev’d on other grounds, Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149.

The government argues that the officers searched Arnold’s tangible property, not his person, and therefore the search was routine and did not require reasonable suspicion. However, as the Court recognized during the evidentiary hearing, the information contained in a laptop and in electronic storage devices renders a search of their contents substantially more intrusive than a search of the contents of a lunchbox or other tangible object.

A laptop and its storage devices have the potential to contain vast amounts of information. People keep all types of personal information on computers, including diaries, personal letters, medical information, photos and financial records. Attorneys’ computers may contain confidential client information. Reporters’ computers may contain information about confidential sources or story leads. Inventors’ and corporate executives’ computers may contain trade secrets. In this case, Arnold kept child pornography on his laptop and in his storage devices; however, “[i]t is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people.” Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 548 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

Comment: This is a significant case. The court recognizes the obvious: A computer search is highly invasive, a violation of personal privacy, and should only be undertaken with articulable justification, whatever the circumstances. The only other border search case involving a computer that I am aware of is United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. July 24, 2006), where Customs actually had PC to believe that the computer coming in at the Seattle airport had child porn on it because Canadian customs searched the computer and denied Romm entry and called U.S. Customs to tell them he was coming back.

The Fifth Circuit held in a case three weeks ago, received only today, that, while the police may have unlawfully entered the defendant’s premises without consent, they were going with her there to get ID and went inside for self-protection. The actions of those inside were suspicious enough to justify a protective sweep. United States v. Ibarra-Zelaya, 465 F.3d 596 (5th Cir. September 20, 2006).

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