Identity evidence is not automatically suppressible after an illegal arrest. United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. August 11, 2006):

Seeking to suppress one’s very identity and body from a criminal proceeding merely because of an unconstitutional arrest is the sort of jurisdictional challenge foreclosed by Lopez-Mendoza. The language in Lopez-Mendoza merely says that the defendant cannot suppress the entire issue of his identity. A defendant may still seek suppression of specific pieces of evidence (such as, say, fingerprints or statements) under the ordinary rules announced in Mapp and Wong Sun. A broader reading of Lopez-Mendoza would give the police carte blanche powers to engage in any manner of unconstitutional conduct so long as their purpose was limited to establishing a defendant’s identity. We do not believe the Supreme Court intended Lopez-Mendoza to be given such a reading.

Drug SW execution had dog alert on a lock box, and police found 1768 photographs inside of defendant having sex with minors. The search was legal. United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. August 11, 2006).*

A police officer responding to a burglar alarm can conduct a search if he or she reasonably suspects that a burglary or some other type of crime is in progress. United States v. McCullough, 457 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. August 10, 2006).

Knock-and-talk and consent entry at 3:15 a.m. was not inherently coercive. The TV was on when the officers arrived, and the occupant came to the door in 30 seconds fully dressed. Five officers entered, and she consented to searching for proof of counterfeiting. Shortly thereafter, the defendant showed up, and he “consented,” too. United States v. Brown, 190 Fed. Appx. 704 (10th Cir. August 8, 2006) (unpublished). Note: If the occupant had been asleep, I submit that a 3:15 a.m. knock-and-talk with five officers would be inherently coercive, without a doubt.

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