VA upholds DNA taking on arrest that linked defendant to other rape

May DNA be taken via search incident to an arrest, at least for a violent crime? Virginia appears to hold that it does.

Virginia permits DNA samples on arrest for violent felonies incident to arrest. Va. “Code § 19.2-310.2:1 authorizes law enforcement officers to obtain a sample of ‘saliva or tissue’ for DNA testing from anyone arrested for certain violent felonies. The testing is meant to isolate genetic ‘identification characteristics specific to the person.’ Code § 19.2-310.2:1. After a magistrate or grand jury confirms that probable cause exists for the arrest, id., the sampling logistics are coordinated by the ‘law-enforcement agency responsible for arrest booking in the jurisdiction.’ Code § 19.2-310.3:1(A).” A taking incident to an arrest was not shown to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 634 S.E.2d 372 (Va. App. September 12, 2006):

On appeal, Anderson argues that the statute violates the Fourth Amendment because it authorizes what amounts to a “suspicionless search” unrelated to any effort by law enforcement to obtain evidence for the specific charge justifying the arrest. We disagree.

A search of an arrestee requires no independent legal justification apart from the arrest itself. “A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.” United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973). “It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search.” Id. Upon a “lawful custodial arrest, a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.” Id. “With the person’s loss of liberty upon arrest comes the loss of at least some, if not all, rights to personal privacy otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment.” Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992).

That is particularly true when the search merely seeks to identify the arrestee. When a person is “arrested upon probable cause, his identification becomes a matter of legitimate state interest and he can hardly claim privacy in it.” Id.; see also Smith v. United States, 117 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 324 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (recognizing as “elementary” the proposition that arrestees may be fingerprinted and photographed “as part of routine identification processes”). The state’s interest in the arrestee’s identity, moreover, “is relevant not only to solving the crime for which the suspect is arrested, but also for maintaining a permanent record to solve other past and future crimes.” Jones, 962 F.2d at 306.

Though the probable cause justifying an arrest likewise justifies a search incident to an arrest, it does not follow that the Fourth Amendment has no further role in limiting the manner of the incidental search. In this case, however, Anderson does not challenge the specific manner in which his DNA sample was taken or the nominal degree of physical invasiveness it may have involved. See id. at 307 (finding that even the DNA blood test sampling procedure involves “virtually no risk, trauma, or pain” (citation omitted)). Thus, this case does not require us to determine at what point a search incident to an arrest becomes unreasonable due to the manner in which it is performed.

For these reasons, we hold that the collection of a DNA sample from Anderson under Code § 19.2-310.2:1 did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. The procedure involved a permissible application of law enforcement’s authority to search an arrestee incident to an arrest.

There is no such thing as a due process claim under the “Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” The complaint is construed solely under the Fourteenth Amendment. Croom v. Wagner, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64915 (E.D. Pa. September 11, 2006)* (pro se prisoner complaint).

Having considered the merits of the stop and arrest claim, “We conclude defendant was not prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to file a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence because it would not have had a reasonable likelihood of success.” People v. Morrison, 367 Ill. App. 3d 581, 305 Ill. Dec. 362, 855 N.E.2d 253 (2d Dist. September 12, 2006, released for publication October 19, 2006).*

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