A New Hampshire judge issued a search warrant for Comcast subscriber information which was located in New Jersey. While the judge lacked authority to issue a search warrant for evidence in New Jersey, there were other ways for judicial process to gather the evidence, such as the Uniform Act for Attendance of Witnesses from Without State. However, defendant’s subjective expectation of privacy in his IP subscriber information was not one that society was prepared to find was reasonable. The court declines to follow a New Jersey case based on its different state constitution. State v. Mello, 162 N.H. 115, 27 A.2d 771 (2011):

Likewise, we see no meaningful distinction between obtaining telephone numbers recorded in the ordinary course of business by a telephone company and the procurement of a customer’s basic subscriber information from an Internet service provider. As in Valenzuela and Gubitosi, the defendant voluntarily provided the information to Comcast, which recorded it in the ordinary course of business for billing purposes and used it to provide the defendant with Internet service. Having voluntarily provided this information in order to use Comcast’s service, the defendant cannot now claim a privacy interest in it. See Valenzuela, 130 N.H. at 188 (explaining that once a defendant voluntarily discloses information to another he cannot claim a degree of privacy protection against the government because it would result in “a kind of evidentiary copyright”). Accordingly, we join the overwhelming majority of federal and state courts that have addressed this issue and conclude that a defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in subscriber information voluntarily provided to an Internet service provider. [citations omitted]

Our conclusion is bolstered by Comcast’s customer privacy policy, which specifically reserves the right to disclose subscriber information to “comply with law.” The defendant contends that this exception to the privacy policy is inapplicable because Comcast responded to a defective warrant. We are unpersuaded by this distinction because Comcast undoubtedly believed that it was disclosing the defendant’s information in order to “comply with law.”

. . .

The defendant also points us to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Reid, 194 N.J. 386, 945 A.2d 26 (N.J. 2008), which, contrary to the majority of jurisdictions, recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy in Internet subscriber information. Reid, 945 A.2d at 33-34. The court in Reid began its analysis by recognizing that federal courts, relying upon “settled federal law that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information exposed to third parties, like a telephone company or bank,” have found no expectation of privacy in Internet subscriber information. Id. at 31. Nonetheless, the court reached a different conclusion based upon its own case law, which recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone billing and bank records. Id. at 32.

Despite our previous reliance upon “settled federal law” recognizing no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily exposed to third parties, the defendant urges us to adopt the reasoning of Reid. He contends that our State Constitution, like New Jersey’s State Constitution, provides greater privacy protection than the Federal Constitution. …

At an immigration checkpoint, the defendant refused to look at the officer questioning his seatmate. Defendant was traveling alone without luggage and said he had clothes in Austin but his DL said he lived in Brownsville. The officer had reasonable suspicion. The defendant consented to further detention and methamphetamine was found in his shoes. United States v. Lopez, 428 Fed. Appx. 376 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished):

The Supreme Court, however, has upheld the constitutionality of suspicionless searches at permanent immigration checkpoints like the one involved in this case. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116 (1976); see also United States v. Moreno-Vargas, 315 F.3d 489, 490 (5th Cir. 2002). Border Patrol agents stationed at a permanent checkpoint may stop a vehicle, question its occupants about their citizenship, and conduct a visual inspection of the vehicle without any individualized suspicion that the vehicle or its occupants are involved in a crime. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558-61. This rule applies equally to commercial buses. See Portillo-Aguirre, 311 F.3d at 652; United States v. Ventura, 447 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2006).

The first case to apply Davis and Belton-Gant good faith. United States v. Caudle, 430 Fed. Appx. 809 (11th Cir. 2011).*

The search warrant for plaintiff’s computer for child pornography based solely on allegations of child molestation was without probable cause where there was not even a suggestion a computer was used by plaintiff. However, because of a circuit split of authority, qualified immunity applies. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2011).*

Defendant was stopped and struggled with officers dropping packages of heroin. He was able to lunge for the heroin and swallow it. The search of his car was valid under the automobile exception. State v. Winfrey, 302 Conn. 195, 24 A.3d 1218 (2011).*

Claimant’s action for return of property filed ten years after seizure was barred is an equitable action under (now) Rule 41(g) when the government said it didn’t have the property. Van Jackson v. United States, 427 Fed. Appx. 524 (7th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

Just raising a Franks issue gets you no hearing; a substantial preliminary showing is required, and here there wasn’t one. United States v. Clark, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90776 (D. S.D. August 15, 2011).*

A parole search of defendant’s belongings in a U-Haul truck was subject to the parolee’s control at the time where he was following the truck in a car and all his possessions were in it. The officer had probable cause to believe defendant was still “in control” of the truck, even though he wasn’t driving it. United States v. Smith, 424 Fed. Appx. 686 (9th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).

The “facts available to the officer” clearly established that the consenter had apparent authority to consent to a search of the property. The officer knew that the consenter owned the house. United States v. Ammons, 419 Fed. Appx. 550, 2011 FED App. 0190N (6th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

Reasonable suspicion is subject to the collective knowledge doctrine. United States v. Laughman, 618 F.2d 1067, 1072-73 & n.3 (4th Cir. 1980). United States v. Tataw, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33120 (E.D. Va. March 28, 2011).*

Defendant’s stop was for a traffic violation and with reasonable suspicion he was involved in drug dealing. His frisk and vehicle frisk was justified by the drug dealing RS alone. United States v. Jones, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82741 (M.D. Ala. June 29, 2011)*:

Here, when Stacey conducted the patdown, he believed that the driver of the vehicle was en route to purchase narcotics with a large quantity of cash. He also believed that Jones had taken an extended time to stop his vehicle and that he appeared to be nervous. Prior cases have recognized that “‘investigative detentions involving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with danger to police officers,’” noting the “inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047-1048 (1983) (citation omitted). In addition, individuals involved in narcotics trafficking are often armed. United States v. Cruz, 909 F.2d 422, 424 (11 Cir. 1989); …

The CI’s believable information dealt with past, recent, and likely current possession of drugs in defendant’s house, so the warrant was not stale. State v. Marsing, 244 Ore. App. 556, 260 P.3d 739 (2011).*

The findings of consent are supported by the record. United States v. Marin-Hipolito, 434 Fed. Appx. 346 (5th Cir. 2011).*

Plaintiff was fleeing from an arrest from failure to pay child support. Intending to reach for his 19.2 oz taser, the officer accidentally pulled his 38 oz Glock and shot the fleeing plaintiff. He was admittedly not trained on the taser and had both the gun and taser on the same side. Despite his claimed honest mistake, shooting an unarmed misdemeanant was objectively unreasonable. Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 2011)*:

The parties have stipulated, however, that the shooting here was based on a mistake of fact insofar as Purnell believed he was firing his Taser rather than his Glock. Based on this stipulation, Purnell attempts to defend the constitutionality of his actions by maintaining that he simply made an “honest mistake.” Appellee’s Br. 22 (internal quotation marks omitted). But it is not the honesty of Purnell’s intentions that determines the constitutionality of his conduct; rather it is the objective reasonableness of his actions. It is certainly true that mistaken, but reasonable, decisions do not transgress constitutional bounds. See, e.g., McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002 (4th Cir. 1994). All actions, however, mistaken or otherwise, are subject to an objective test.

There were several facts that Purnell knew or should have known that would have alerted any reasonable officer to the fact that he was holding his Glock. First, and most basically, Purnell knew he carried his Taser in the holster on his right thigh, which was about a foot lower than the holster on his hip that held his Glock. See Sevigny v. Dicksey, 846 F.2d 953, 957 n.5 (4th Cir. 1988) (“Objective inquiry into the reasonableness of an officer’s perception of the critical facts leading to an arrest … must charge him with possession of all the information reasonably discoverable by an officer acting reasonably under the circumstances. Indeed his subjective beliefs about the matter, however induced, are actually irrelevant to the inquiry.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, Purnell could feel the weight of the weapon he held in his hand, which, at about 38 ounces, was nearly twice the weight of his Taser. Third, Purnell knew the Taser had a thumb safety that had to be flipped to arm the weapon. The Glock he was holding had no thumb safety.10 This was not a situation in which the facts known to the officer led to multiple reasonable inferences.

It was not clearly established that using a portable ion scanning machine was a possible Fourth Amendment violation, particularly of employees and contractors entering a prison, so qualified immunity applied. Braun v. Maynard, 652 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 2011):

On August 12, 2008, officials at the Maryland Correctional Training Center conducted a drug interdiction operation using a portable ion scanning machine capable of detecting minute amounts of controlled substances. Upon entering the building, several employees and independent contractors of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services alerted for the presence of drugs and were then searched. Nothing turned up. The aggrieved employees filed suit, alleging principally that the searches violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The district court held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the suit.

We affirm. The prison officials in this case faced difficult questions lying at the intersection of the Fourth Amendment’s broad commands, the prison’s compelling needs, and technology’s innovations. Although it was clearly established that intrusive prison employee searches require reasonable suspicion, it was far from clear that the devices at issue here could not meet that standard. Because no clearly established federal law placed the officers on notice that fighting contraband in the prison environment in this manner was unlawful, we agree with the district court that the immunity attached.

. . .

With this context in mind, it was not clearly established that the searches here could not meet Leverette’s standard. As the complaint asserts, an Ionscan can detect the presence of drugs on a person’s clothing or possessions. It defies belief, then, to think that a positive Ionscan test gives no indication that someone is “hiding contraband on his or her person,” as prison employees are unlikely to waltz into prison with contraband “hidden” only on their shirts. Indeed, given the nature of prison security, it is likely that an employee smuggler would place the contraband in a fairly concealed location on his person. We need not and do not hold that positive Ionscan results will always justify a strip search; nonetheless, it was not clearly established that the Ionscan results obtained here could not.

So what of the merits of an Ion scan when an employee gets busted? Apparently it is valid, based on the far lower expectation of privacy prison employees have when they enter the secure area. Strip search? Not yet decided.

Defendant’s Jeep was searched in 2006 after a fresh complaint of rape with a gun and handcuffs led to his stop. Defendant was handcuffed and placed in a police car and the Jeep was searched for the gun; it wasn’t found, but handcuffs were. The defendant argued that his handcuffing and being placed in the police car made the search incident invalid. The court decides that the search incident was valid because the car was linked to the crime. Alternatively, a warrant was issued for the car, and inevitable discovery would have applied. Commonwealth v. Starkweather, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 791, 950 N.E.2d 461 (2011)*:

In this case, the defendant’s arrest was precisely for the crime that was the predicate for the search. … The defendant was arrested for having committed a felony sexual assault offense, which the arresting officers, acting with probable cause, could reasonably believe occurred that same evening. Based on the radio dispatches, the officers could reasonably believe that the suspect might be armed, and that the Jeep where the rape took place and the truck — to which the defendant appeared to be moving things — probably would harbor evidence relevant to the crime.

[So, doesn’t this precisely state the factors that make the automobile exception apply? The police had information from the victim of the rape in the Jeep, so it could be seized and searched under that exception. Why didn’t the court go there? Am I missing something? The search incident doctrine is limited to the suspect’s reaching ability, and the automobile exception is not. Massachusetts practitioners can just ignore this case as “right result, wrong reason.”]

Defendant was in a low-speed chase from the police, and he tossed 82g of crack from the car as he was driving before he stopped. He was not seized when he tossed the crack. United States v. Griffin, 652 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 2011).*

U.S. Marshals had an arrest warrant for Boyd who they found in a motel room. When they entered for a protective sweep, they also found defendant who had just stayed there with Boyd, an old friend he ran into in a bar the night before. Defendant was not compliant with their order to get down, and then he wouldn’t give his name or DOB. He consented to looking in his pocket for his ID, but there were drugs in the pocket, too. The scope of consent did not require the officers to ignore the obvious. United States v. Chaney, 647 F.3d 401 (1st Cir. 2011):

The tight confines of a pants pocket leave a searching hand little room for maneuvering and distinguishing between various objects that may be contained therein. Given consent to retrieve an object from such a cramped space, it is objectively reasonable to assume that the consent extends to the removal of items that either may constitute the object of the search and cannot be immediately identified or that obstruct further access to other items in the pocket. Nothing in Chaney’s exchange with Detective Newcomb suggests that he intended to withhold consent for these sorts of practical measures that are reasonable incidents to the search of a pocket. Chaney’s argument appears to be that, absent explicit permission to remove items other than evidence of identification, the detective was required to fish around in the pocket until he located an item that he could positively identify to be some form of identification and that could be removed without dislodging other items. The “typical reasonable person” would not so interpret Chaney’s exchange with the officer.

Plaintiff was stopped on suspicion of impersonating a police officer because of the stuff on his Chevy Tahoe. Shortly into the stop, plaintiff became angry and said “this is bullshit,” and said he had a concealed carry permit and he was a security guard. Because of his demeanor, the officer handcuffed him. Other officers arrived. A warrant was found for what they thought was plaintiff, and he was taken in. On further review, it was determined that plaintiff was the wrong person, and within two hours he was taken back to his house and property returned. His suit for excessive force for the too tight handcuffing was barred by qualified immunity. O’Malley v. City of Flint, 652 F.3d 662, 2011 FED App. 0194P (6th Cir. 2011).*

Two guys standing at a car talking to the occupants was not reasonable suspicion. “The fact that Mr. Dell and his companion were standing on either side of the parked car, looking into the windows in a back-and-forth manner is not enough to give Officer Tafisi reasonable suspicion that they were engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Dell, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27426 (D. Utah March 15, 2011).*

A knock-and-talk led to officers gaining access to a locked basement to the house where a grow operation was found. This was all by consent. United States v. Greene, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27219 (E.D. Tenn. February 16, 2011).*

Defendant was validly in custody in the back of a police car, and the officer went back to talk to him. “The Court finds that the statement, ‘What you’re looking for is lying on the front seat of the vehicle,’ to be effective consent to search the vehicle. ‘The standard for measuring the scope of the suspect’s consent is objective reasonableness. Recitation of magic words is unnecessary; the key inquiry focuses on what the typical person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect.’ United States v. Stewart, 93 F.3d 189, 192 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).” United States v. Olivarria, 781 F. Supp. 2d 387 (N.D. Miss. 2011).*

Defendant was sentenced to prison followed by probation in the Philadelphia Gun Court, and he was given a condition of random searches of his residence by the court. Under Pennsylvania law, there at least had to be reasonable suspicion for the search. Commonwealth v. Alexander, 2011 PA Super 54, 16 A.3d 1152 (2011).*

Defendant’s Franks challenge to a seizure for forfeiture was unsuccessful because the affidavits as a whole show probable cause. United States v. Dupree, 781 F. Supp. 2d 115 (E.D. N.Y. 2011).*

Defendant’s original probation term did not include a prohibition on possession of a computer, and that condition was added by a general order of the court to all sex offender probationers. Aside from that condition, defendant’s admission of possession of pornography on his computer was cause for seizing the computer. United States v. Simard, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27874 (D. Vt. March 17, 2011).*

Defendant’s guilty plea specifically waived all his potential challenges to the search and seizure, and his generalized complaint that defense counsel did not work for him was belied by filings in the case sheet alone. Fjerstad v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27944 (W.D. Wash. February 2, 2011).*

At this stage of the pleadings, plaintiff stated a claim for relief for DFPS violating their clearly established Fourth Amendment rights in the entry of defendants’ home without alleged consent, exigent circumstances, or special needs. Thomas v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 427 Fed. Appx. 309 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished):

We first inquire whether any of the alleged violations, as stated, would represent a violation of Appellants’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In this Circuit, it is “well established … that the Fourth Amendment regulates social workers’ civil investigations.” Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 420 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Roe, 299 F.3d at 401). We have further noted that “[w]arrantless searches of a person’s home are presumptively unreasonable unless the person consents, or unless probable cause and exigent circumstances justify the search.” Id. (quoting United States v. Gomez-Moreno, 479 F.3d 350, 354 (5th Cir. 2007)) (alteration in Gates). Therefore, based on the allegations in the complaint, Collins violated Appellants’ constitutional rights unless we find that consent, exigent circumstances, or special needs existed.

District court’s finding of perjury at suppression hearing supports its obstruction of justice sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. United States v. Garcia-Covarrubias, 427 Fed. Appx. 373 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).

Defendant’s 2255 challenging his search was waived by his plea agreement, and there was no IAC in the plea. United States v. Lopez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61022 (E.D. Ky. March 16, 2011).*

Traffic stop led to officer seeing marijuana in plain view with a flashlight in a bowl on the console. United States v. Hafford, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61276 (M.D. La. June 7, 2011).*

Storage unit operators who locked defendant out of storage unit were not acting with the state actors when they did it, so they couldn’t be sued under § 1983. Moral v. Grant County, 424 Fed. Appx. 803 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

The protective sweep of defendant’s house was invalid, and the government’s raising that issue three times without a motion to reconsider borders on being impertinent. Nevertheless, there was a search warrant independently issued, and that cured the view of the protective sweep. United States v. Gillespie, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71473 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2011).*

Defendant was stopped for talking on a cell phone. Once stopped, the police were free to look at the interior of his car. He also consented to a search of the car. United States v. Pichardo, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72045 (D. V.I. July 5, 2011).*

Defendant’s detention was lawful under Michigan v. Summers, so defense counsel was not ineffective for not raising it. United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2011).*

The Third Circuit holds en banc (8-6-1) that post arrest, pre-conviction DNA testing is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, just like fingerprinting to identify the defendant. United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc):

Ruben Mitchell was indicted on one count of attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Following Mitchell‘s indictment, arrest, and detention, the Government sought to collect a DNA sample. The Government relied on 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A), which permits the collection of DNA samples from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted. Mitchell objected, arguing that the statute violated the Fourth Amendment. Agreeing with Mitchell, the District Court concluded that the statute was unconstitutional and prohibited the Government from taking a DNA sample from Mitchell prior to conviction.

As a threshold matter, we address whether we possess appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal by the Government. We conclude that this appeal falls within the narrow class of orders immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine enunciated in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). Turning to the merits, we apply a totality of the circumstances test, balancing the intrusion on Mitchell‘s privacy against the Government‘s interest in the collection and testing of his DNA. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001). As arrestees have a diminished expectation of privacy in their identities, and DNA collection from arrestees serves important law enforcement interests, we conclude that such collection is reasonable and does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we will reverse.

. . .

This logic [of collecting fingerprints] extends to the collection and analysis of DNA samples from arrestees and pretrial detainees. See Anderson v. Virginia, 650 S.E.2d 702, 705 (Va. 2007) (“A DNA sample of the accused taken upon arrest, while more revealing, is no different in character than acquiring fingerprints upon arrest.”). DNA collection occurs only after it has been determined that there is probable cause to believe that the arrestee committed a crime. In light of this probable cause finding, arrestees possess a diminished expectation of privacy in their own identity, which has traditionally justified taking their fingerprints and photographs.Likewise, because DNA profiles developed pursuant to the DNA Act function as genetic fingerprints. used only for identification purposes, arrestees and pretrial detainees have reduced privacy interests in the information derived from a DNA sample.

. . .

In light of the restrictions built into the DNA profiling process, Mitchell‘s arguments that it constitutes a significant invasion of privacy are unavailing. Relying on the District Court‘s opinion, Mitchell argues that collection of DNA from arrestees and pretrial detainees cannot be justified on the basis of probable cause as they have not yet been convicted of any offense and thus have the benefit of the presumption of innocence. See Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 607. The District Court properly declined to elevate a finding of probable cause to the level of a proper determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 606. Nonetheless, it acknowledged that an arrestee or pretrial detainee, who is brought into the criminal justice system on the basis of probable cause has a diminished expectation of privacy in his identity. Id. at 608. The District Court nevertheless concluded that the presumption of innocence outweighed this diminished expectation of privacy because of the complex, comprehensive, inherently private information contained in a DNA sample. Id. As we discussed above, however, this conclusion is based on a flawed premise—that because DNA samples may reveal private information regarding familial lineage and predisposition to over four thousand types of genetic conditions and diseases [as well as] genetic markers for traits, the DNA profiles entered into CODIS also contain this information. Id. (emphasis added). DNA profiles, as opposed to DNA samples, reveal only identity, in which arrestees have a diminished expectation of privacy.

In sum, at present DNA profiling is simply a more precise method of ascertaining identity and is thus akin to fingerprinting, which has long been accepted as part of routine booking procedures. The traditional fingerprinting cases emphasize that arrestees and pretrial detainees have a diminished expectation of privacy in their identity. …

Dissent:

I respectfully dissent because I find both of the majority’s conclusions here – that we have jurisdiction over this appeal and that the Government’s program of collecting, analyzing, and maintaining the DNA of arrestees and pretrial detainees comports with the Fourth Amendment – to be seriously flawed.

Prosecutorial immunity does not protect a prosecutor who ordered the arrest of a material witness and then failed to tell the court ordering detention of material changes in circumstances affecting the need for detention. Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313 (3d Cir. 2011)*:

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. This case is about a seizure and presents questions of whether and how the Constitution’s guarantee applies in the case of a material witness who was jailed for weeks on end, even though the date of the trial in which she was to testify had been pushed back several months. We hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to such a detention, and that it requires a prosecutor responsible for such a detention to inform the judge who ordered the witness’s incarceration of any substantial change in the underlying circumstances. We also conclude that the prosecutor in this case had “fair warning” of the constitutional right she is accused of violating, and that she is therefore not shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Finally, we reaffirm our earlier holding that absolute prosecutorial immunity does not apply. We will therefore affirm the District Court’s order denying summary judgment to the defendant.

Defendant went to prison and left his computer with his girlfriend. When they lived together, his child pornography folders were password protected. Before he left, he removed the password protection. The computer crashed and she got a friend to work on it. He was on federal probation for a drug crime, and he asked the girlfriend whether he could give it to his probation officer as his own CYA. She agreed. She had apparent authority to consent to a search of the computer. He gave her control over the computer while he was imprisoned. The District Court also credited defendant’s early admission that she was a co-owner. United States v. Stanley, 653 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2011).

In an investigation of a murder case with a shot suspect, the affidavit for the search warrant showed a fair probability that evidence would be found in defendant’s house because of the connection of the vehicle fleeing the scene being found at the house. United States v. Holloway, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84397 (D. Kan. August 1, 2011).*

The CI’s tip defendant was manufacturing meth was corroborated by records of his purchases of ingredients, his prior convictions, and corroboration of other somewhat minor details. United States v. Wyatt, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84204 (W.D. Ky. July 29, 2011).*

The vehicle stop was with probable cause of a traffic infraction, so reasonable suspicion of drug activity does not have to be decided. United States v. Belcher, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83769 (E.D. Ky. June 13, 2011).*

Locked exterior door to a common area in a multi-unit apartment building does not create a separate or better expectation of privacy. Defendant arrested there had no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. United States v. Correa, 653 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2011):

A Task Force searching for an escaped fugitive entered the common areas of a multi-unit apartment building. The building had a locked exterior door, and an inspector entered through a partially opened side window. Once inside, the Task Force apprehended Defendant-Appellant Frank Correa in a common-use stairwell, and, after a struggle, Correa informed the inspector he had a firearm. The inspector retrieved the firearm from Correa’s pocket. Correa moved to suppress the firearm and the statement he made to the inspector as fruit of an illegal seizure. The District Court denied the motion. We previously held in United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1252 (3d Cir. 1992), that a resident of an unlocked multi-unit apartment building lacks an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the building’s common areas. We determine today that the presence of a locked exterior door does not alter that expectation. Accordingly, Correa’s suppression motion was properly denied. We will affirm.

The recording of a telephonic search warrant request clearly showed that the issuing magistrate did not act as a rubber stamp. In fact, the officer sought a warrant for urine as well, and the judge denied it. “Having considered the recording of the warrant application process and other related evidence, this Court is unable to find that Judge Emery abandoned his judicial role in any way, such as by failing to act in a neutral and detached manner, acting as a mere rubber stamp, engaging in the ‘competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,’ see Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948), or blindly approving the telephonic warrant.” United States v. Valandra, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87004 (D. S.D. August 5, 2011), R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87242 (D. S.D. June 9, 2011).

Defendant essentially consented to officers following him into his home to get clothes after he was arrested, but it was permissible under Washington v. Chrisman. United States v. Crisosto-Vera, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87610 (D. Ariz. August 5, 2011), R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87815 (D. Ariz., June 10, 2011).*

Defendants were stopped for a lane change without a turn signal, and the resulting stop took 21 minutes, nine of which was spent waiting for a criminal history check. In the meantime, the driver and the passenger had wildly inconsistent stories about their travel plans. That plus their extreme nervousness and driving a rental car was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Kitchell, 653 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7234 (U.S., Oct. 11, 2011).*

A nighttime search warrant could be unreasonable, but this one was not. It was issued by a state judge complying with state law showing a need for a nighttime search, and that complied with the Fourth Amendment. The court indicates that a nighttime search could, in some circumstances, be unreasonable. United States v. Kelley, 652 F.3d 915 (8th Cir. 2011):

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. Police intrusion into the privacy of one’s home at night was a concern of the common law before the Fourth Amendment was adopted. Reflecting that concern, our first Congress by statute authorized only daytime searches in 1789. See United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896, 898 (3d Cir. 1968). In Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995), a unanimous Supreme Court held that “in some circumstances an officer’s unannounced entry into a home might be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,” expressing “little doubt that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an officer’s entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure.” Although this constitutional issue has received surprisingly little attention in numerous night-time search decisions, we have little doubt that in some circumstances an officer’s night-time entry into a home might be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 462-63 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498-99 (1958).

“With few exceptions,” the Supreme Court has required that police obtain a warrant before searching a person’s home. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001). Given the long common law and statutory history of requiring that a night- time search of a home be authorized by warrant, when police intend at the time they apply for a warrant to execute the search at night, it is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment not to disclose that intent to the issuing magistrate and to seek express authorization for the night-time search, as Arkansas Rule 13.2(c) and Federal Rule 41(e)(2)(A)(ii) require. Here, Sergeant Michaels did just that, presenting the state court judge with probable cause to issue a warrant and good cause to authorize an immediate, night-time search. And the warrant expressly authorized execution at any time. Thus, both the warrant and its execution were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment; indeed, they complied with Federal Rule 41. Compare United States v. Harris, 324 F.3d 602, 606 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 884 (2003). The motion to suppress was properly denied.