Defendant passenger in a car was not in custody or subjected to a show of force when she consented to a search of her purse. The driver had been arrested, and the passenger was going to be let go. The officer suggested she call for a ride, but she couldn’t raise friends. He asked if she could walk and she said she could. Then the officer asked for consent and got it finding drugs in her purse. She was free to go, but consented. State v. Dudley, 245 Ore. App. 301, 263 P.3d 1054 (2011), on remand from State v. Dudley, 349 Ore. 663, 249 P.3d 1281 (2011).

Defendant’s stop was valid, and a drug dog was a minute away. The delay in getting the dog there was not unreasonable. Defendant was an unauthorized driver of the rental car, and he lacked standing to challenge the search. United States v. Jefferson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100742 (S.D. Fla. September 8, 2011), R&R 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143674 (S.D. Fla. December 19, 2010).

Pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim is governed by the Fourth Amendment. Bryson v. Okla. County ex rel. Okla. County Det. Ctr., 2011 OK CIV APP 98, 261 P.3d 627 (2011).*

A Municipal Judge’s denial of a search warrant is not res judicata barring the police for asking for consent. Res judicata is a final judgment on the merits. The basis for denial of the warrant is not revealed by the record. “Moreover, Appellant presents no law that indicates that the denial of a search warrant is a final appealable order which would lead to the invocation of the doctrine of res judicata in subsequent proceedings. [¶] There is simply no indication as to why the search warrant was denied or what parties were involved in the request for the warrant or indication that an actual hearing took place.” Moreover, his consent was an independent act. State v. Mackenzie, 2011 Ohio 4966, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 4091 (5th Dist. September 28, 2011).

Defendant was driving a car with permission of the owner, and he succeeded in showing that the stop lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause, so the search is suppressed. The sole basis for the stop was that the color of the car did not match the DMV registration. United States v. Uribe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112001 (S.D. Ind. September 28, 2011).*

Defendant’s contention that the officer stalled the stop to get more time for the drug dog to arrive was rejected because of the overall time limit involved from beginning to end: 13½ minutes. Dickey v. State, 2011 WY 136, 261 P.3d 739 (Wyo. 2011).*

Search of pharmacy records to show that defendant was obtaining the same controlled substance from two doctors at the same time was not a violation of HIPAA or state law. State v. Thompson, 72 So. 3d 246 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), following State v. Tamulonis, 39 So. 3d 524, 527 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).

A police pursuit into an adjoining town would not lead to suppression under inevitable discovery because an officer from that town arrived at the scene as the pursuing officer was making the arrest. Commonwealth v. Lahey, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 606, 954 N.E.2d 1131 (2011).*

An officer responded to a shots fired call and found only one vehicle which he attempted to stop and the driver took thirty seconds to stop without apparent justification. The officer could reasonably believe there was a gun in the car, and, once stopped, he smell marijuana coming from the car. Then there was probable cause. United States v. King, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117609 (D. Utah October 11, 2011).*

“Reason to believe” a suspect named in a warrant is home is less than “probable cause.” People v. Downey, 198 Cal. App. 4th 652, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 402 (4th Dist. 2011):

An arrest warrant “founded on probable cause” that the suspect has committed a crime gives law enforcement officers “the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” (Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 603 [63 L.Ed.2d 639, 100 S.Ct. 1371]; see also Steagald v. United States (1981) 451 U.S. 204, 213–214 [68 L.Ed.2d 38, 101 S.Ct. 1642, .) “As explicated by five other circuits, the ‘reason to believe’ standard is satisfied by something less than would be required for a finding of ‘probable cause.’” (U.S. v. Thomas (D.C. Cir. 2005) 368 U.S. App. D.C. 285 [429 F.3d 282, 286], citing Valdez v. McPheters (10th Cir. 1999) 172 F.3d 1220, 1225–1226; see U.S. v. Route (5th Cir. 1997) 104 F.3d 59, 62; U.S. v. Risse (8th Cir. 1996) 83 F.3d 212, 216; U.S. v. Lauter (2d Cir. 1995) 57 F.3d 212, 215; U.S. v. Magluta (11th Cir. 1995) 44 F.3d 1530, 1535; see also U.S. v. Bervaldi (11th Cir. 2000) 226 F.3d 1256, 1263; U.S. v. Lovelock (2d Cir. 1999) 170 F.3d 339, 343; U.S. v. Weems (1st Cir. 2003) 322 F.3d 18, 22 [in dictum].)

Affidavit’s lack of a time reference for when CI saw drugs in defendant’s possession was a lack of probable cause. Nevertheless, the good faith exception applies because the officer’s belief in probable cause was not unreasonable under Leon. State v. Wilbers, 347 S.W.3d 552 (Mo. App. 2011):

That there could be some future-deterrent value in suppressing the evidence here is not debatable. “[W]e do not suggest that the exclusion of this evidence could have no deterrent effect. But our cases require any deterrence to ‘be weighed against the “substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule,”’ and here exclusion is not worth the cost.” Herring, 555 U.S. 135 at __, 129 S.Ct. at 702, n.4 (internal citations omitted and emphasis added). As the error found in this case rests not on the officer, but rather on the issuing court, the good-faith exception applies.

Therefore, for all the reasons stated above, the evidence obtained as a result of the invalid search warrant is admissible by application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

A city ordinance that permitted random stops for inspection of taxicabs was moot by the way plaintiff pursued it. G & C Transp., Inc. v McGrane, 2011 NY Slip Op 21221, 32 Misc. 3d 872, 928 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Orange Co. 2011).*

Defendant contended that he did not waive his Fourth Amendment rights when he was pleading guilty and getting probation. The record showed, however, that the condition was explained to him at the time of the plea. Morrow v. State, 311 Ga. App. 323, 715 S.E.2d 744 (2011).* (Really, all that is required is that it be in the conditions of probation that he signs or has explained to him, and neither the Fourth Amendment nor due process require it be “on the record” of the plea.)

A school official received a report that defendant juvenile smelled of alcohol. When he found her, she had a backpack which she tried to hide. The school official asked about the backpack and then searched it, finding alcohol. The search of the backpack was justified under the school search doctrine. State v. E.K.P., 255 P.3d 870 (Wash. App. 2011).*

Police had a search warrant for defendant’s blood, and his arguments on appeal were that reasonable means were not employed for drawing the blood by a certified medical technologist because she failed to ask his medical history first and because the paperwork could have been more complete. This was not enough to suppress the blood results. Pacheco v. State, 347 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. App.—Ft. Worth 2011).*

The officer did not continue the stop too long. He approached the passenger and asked “if he had anything on his person that the officer should know about. In response to that single question, Simons immediately revealed that he had a pipe in his underwear.” It went downhill from there. State v. Simons, 2011 UT App 251, 687 Utah Adv. Rep. 69, 262 P.3d 53 (2011).*

Defendant consented to the officers coming into his office where they saw marijuana on his desk. He volunteered he had more in the drawer and a cooler under the desk and consented to that too. United States v. Bowser, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83699 (W.D. Mich. July 29, 2011), R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83703 (W.D. Mich. June 22, 2011).*

Defendant consented to a search of his car and his computer at home after he was arrested for showing up after an internet chat with a fake 15 year old girl. He was told that he could consent or the officers would get a warrant [which would almost certainly be granted, except what would they need the computer to prove?]. He consented, saying “what’s done is done.” He also invoked his right to counsel, but a request for consent is not an “interrogation” barred by Miranda. United States v. Knope, 655 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2011):

Knope also asserts that his consent was invalid because he signed the consent form after he invoked his right to counsel. He cites Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981), where the Supreme Court held that police cannot continue an interrogation after the accused invokes his right to counsel. Knope’s argument is foreclosed, however, by this court’s holding that “a consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda.” United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 335 (7th Cir. 1994). Indeed, we rejected nearly identical arguments in Shlater and LaGrone. Knope’s consent was not invalid on these grounds.

Defendant is a doctor accused of running a “pill mill.” She has two residences, and the government investigators concluded that she likely had large amounts of cash in her two residences. The search warrant for her house was validly issued. She’s proceeding pro se. In re Hoover’s Residence, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92783 (N.D. W.Va. August 19, 2011).*

Police came to do a knock-and-talk, and defendant objected to a search of the bedroom he shared with his wife. When he objected, the police took the wife and her mother outside to talk about consent. The district court’s effort to find a hierarchy of privacy interests in the home has no foundation in Randolph, and this consent over objection violated Randolph. United States v. Johnson, 656 F.3d 375, 2011 FED App. 0244P (6th Cir. 2011):

The district court interpreted this court’s decision in Ayoub, 498 F.3d 532, as “drawing a distinction [after Randolph] between superior possessory and privacy interest[s] and lesser possessory and privacy interests.” The district court stated that, “if one has a lesser privacy interest, then even the presence and active objection to a search by that person with a lesser possessory interest is not a problem if [the police] have received consent to search from an individual with a superior possessory and privacy interest.” However, we have drawn no such distinctions.

Also posted on Federal Criminal Appeals Blog. This case seems too much like the District Court strained to find a way to ignore Randolph–any way to support a conviction.

Defendant was stopped on suspicion of having an underage prostitute in the car. When she could not produce an ID, the officer searched the car for her ID, and that was an invalid search. United States v. Rodgers, 656 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2011):

Passenger and vehicle searches have played a prominent role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has consistently held that probable cause is necessary to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 160-62, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543, T.D. 3686 (1925); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1985). In recent years, the Court has clarified that “[i]f there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity,” the search may extend to any area where evidence might be found. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1721, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982)). In addition, when an arrest is made, a warrantless search is permitted “if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment … or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” Id. at 1723. But the Court has never sanctioned a vehicle search simply because there was probable cause to arrest a passenger or because a passenger could not provide identification. The Fourth Amendment requires more.

“The fact that an informant who admitted dealing drugs had pled guilty to drug charges in federal court was not critical to a finding of probable cause.” Therefore, no Franks violation. United States v. Amaya, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99617 (N.D. Iowa September 6, 2011), R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99702 (N.D. Iowa August 8, 2011).*

Running wants or warrants for a Terry stop for walking in the middle of the street at night was not unreasonable. A warrant led to an arrest and a gun. Grant of motion to suppress reversed. United States v. Burleson, 657 F.3d 1040 (10th Cir. 2011).*

A multitude of factors made reasonable suspicion to believe that an express mail package shipped from a potentially fictitious address in California shipped to a person at a hotel, intending to be transient, likely contained drugs. United States v. Huerta, 655 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 2011).*

Wal-Mart called to tell police of men attempting to use counterfeit credit cards. When the officer arrived he found the men outside, and he stopped to question them. Only one had any ID, and it was a DL that belonged to somebody else. They pointed out the vehicle they were in, and the officer walked up to the vehicle and looked in the window. The two inside wouldn’t look at him, and inside the officer saw and “unusual number” of laptop computer boxes. Reasonable suspicion ripened into probable cause for arrest. United States v. Barry, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102354 (M.D. Pa. September 12, 2011).*

“The ‘typical, reasonable person’ would have understood his agreement to a search for weapons and drugs to constitute just that: a search for weapons and drugs, not an open invitation to remove all of the contents from one’s wallet.” A.L.T. v. State, 63 So. 3d 855 (Fla. App. 4th DCA 2011).

Defendant’s stop as a suspected burglar was valid. He was coming from between houses at night with a flashlight in hand and altered his course to seek to evade the officer. The patfrisk was invalid, but meaningless since nothing was used as evidence. Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 642, 948 N.E.2d 906 (2011).*

Defendant’s IAC claim for not presenting a search issue was not well enough developed to be considered on appeal because of an incomplete record. Since the conviction was reversed on other grounds, he gets another shot at the search issue anyway. State v. Walters, 162 Wn. App. 74, 255 P.3d 835 (2011).*

The defendant wasn’t present to consent or object. His mother had mutual use and could consent. State v. Lathan, 2011 WI App 104, 335 Wis. 2d 234, 801 N.W.2d 772 (2011).*

Defendant was stopped for a loud music complaint, and that led to his being stopped, and then his DL was found to be suspended. That led to a search of the car and that produced cocaine. The loud music statute was unconstitutional as an abridgement of free speech. However, that did not lead to the search being invalid because the officer was not on notice that the statute was unconstitutional. Montgomery v. State, 69 So. 3d 1023 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011).

A woman knocked on a door in an apartment complex in a bathroom saying she had been raped, and her clothing was ripped off in defendant’s apartment. The police were called and went to defendant’s apartment, and a woman answered the door who consented to entry and the officer found the dress ripped as the robed woman described. The entry was legal. Kohn v. State, 69 So. 3d 388, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D 2057 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).*

The state failed to prove constructive possession, yet defendant did not argue that the search condition that the police used was not valid. Ford v. State, 69 So. 3d 391 n.3 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)*:

The record shows that warrantless searches were not a condition of Mr. Ford’s community control. Submission to warrantless search is a special condition that must be specified on the order. § 948.03, Fla. Stat. (2009). On Mr. Ford’s community control order, there is no check mark in special conditions box 20, “You shall submit your person, property, place of residence, vehicle or personal effects to a warrantless search at any time, by any probation or community control officer or any law enforcement officer.” Mr. Ford argued at the hearing that Ms. Davis’s consent was not voluntary, and thus the search was illegal, because the officers told her that they had legal authority to search without consent. See Bumper v. N.C., 391 U.S. 543, 548-50, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 20 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1968); Luna-Martinez v. State, 984 So. 2d 592, 598 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). Mr. Ford did not raise the legality of the search on appeal.

Police responded to a call of a man with a gun in an apartment threatening to kill somebody. They were admitted into the apartment by the caller, and they found the man in the back room with a pillow over his hand. Removal of the pillow revealing a gun was reasonable under the circumstances. There was plenty of reason to believe there was a gun under the pillow. Commonwealth v. Samuel, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 560, 954 N.E.2d 557 (2011).*

The officer approached defendant he already knew from prior encounters to talk to him about a bank robbery. He had no reasonable suspicion, and, if the defendant “blew him off” and walked away, he would have done nothing about it, but if he ran he’d chase. Defendant consented to a search of his pockets for officer safety. State v. Hall, 2011 Ohio 5096, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 4211 (5th Dist. September 26, 2011).*

In an intrusion on seclusion invasion of privacy civil case, procuring admission to plaintiffs’ house under false pretenses was not a cognizable tort. Looking to Fourth Amendment cases where a police officer feigns another purpose to get entry where the consent to enter was not exceeded, this was not a tort. Burnette v. Porter, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 533 (September 30, 2011).*

Doing what Kyllo requires, “[t]he officer requested a warrant to use such a device to search the residence for ‘[anomalous] heat loss occurring at the described premises as a result of an indoor marijuana growing operation, which is being possessed in violation of The Georgia Controlled Substances Act[.]’ A judge granted the application and issued the warrant.” A thermographer was used to measure the heat loss. A copy of the warrant was left after the search. A second search warrant was used to search the house based on the product of the first warrant. Under state statute, a warrant was for “tangible evidence,” and defendant argued that “tangible evidence” did not include heat loss. Based on dictionary definitions, the court concludes that heat loss is “tangible evidence” in the concept of something definite and perceptible. Brundige v. State, 310 Ga. App. 900, 714 S.E.2d 681 (2011):

With these principles in mind, we have reviewed legal and general dictionaries to discern the common and ordinary meaning of the phrase “tangible evidence.” We note that logic dictates that use of the modifier “tangible” distinguishes such evidence from its opposite type, that is, intangible evidence. The phrase “intangible evidence” has been used to describe testimony or verbal statements. Because heat radiating from a building is not simply testimony or verbal evidence and because it is definable and measurable; it is real and substantial, rather than imaginary; it is capable of being clearly grasped by the mind; and it can, at least in some cases, be perceived through the sense of touch, we conclude that heat loss that is measured and recorded by a thermal scanner fits within the scope of “tangible evidence” as that term is used in OCGA § 17-5-21 (a) (5). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that that Code section authorized the first search warrant issued in this case, for the seizure of “anomalous heat loss” occurring at Brundige’s home.

We note that, when the Supreme Court of the United States decided Kyllo v. United States, electronic thermal scanning, a sense-enhancing technology that can be used to discern a person’s activities that are being conducted in a private, constitutionally protected area,7 was not “in general public use.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. at 34 (III).

7 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. at 29-30 (I); People v. Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1229-1230 (I) (52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366) (1996); John Wesley Hall, 1-9 Search and Seizure § 9.15 (3d ed. 2010) (Electronic thermal scanning does not merely measure wasted heat. Rather, “a trained thermal imaging operator can likely determine that a room is occupied and likely what the occupant of the room is doing (such as watching television, eating a meal, exercising, going to the bathroom, or even having sex).”) (footnotes omitted).

After plainly illegal search of a suitcase, defendant was Mirandized at a different place and time and that purged the taint. United States v. Cantu, 426 Fed. Appx. 253 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished):

In this case, the full circumstances of the DEA interrogation served to attenuate any effect from the earlier misconduct. The Miranda warning made clear that Cantu was under no obligation to talk to the police, even if asked to confirm or deny information the police already knew. Further, the DEA interrogation was performed by federal officers, not the sheriff’s deputies who conducted the traffic stop, and neither Deputy Rios nor any other sheriff’s office personnel participated in the DEA interview. The DEA officers wore plain clothes rather than police uniforms, distinguishing them from the sheriff’s deputies. Although the DEA interview took place at the sheriff’s office, it was well removed in time and location from the traffic stop and the patrol car where the earlier misconduct took place.

In short, the DEA interrogation was conducted in a “different place[] … with different people in a different atmosphere” than the illegal search. By distancing the DEA interview from the earlier misconduct, these circumstances created an “atmosphere … more conducive to an act of free will.” That willful act—Cantu’s knowing and voluntary decision to give a written confession—purged any remaining taint from the earlier illegality, weighing heavily in favor of admitting the confession.

County jail inmate survived a motion for summary judgment on a strip search claim where he was strip searched after being denied a contact visit and was under constant surveillance. Jordan v. Cicchi, 428 Fed. Appx. 195 (3d Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

The district court’s injunction against defendant continually attempting to relitigate his 1999 search in 2255’s was affirmed. It was “carefully tailored” and did not prohibit any future litigation for other claims. Shivers v. United States, 427 Fed. Appx. 697 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

In a search incident case, the question is not how the officer accessed the area of the car where the gun was found, it was how the defendant could have. Here, the officer opened the back of a hatchback, but it was accessible from inside, too. [This is also a Gant non-retroactivity case.] United States v. Sain, 421 Fed. Appx. 591, 2011 FED App. 0287N (6th Cir. 2011) (unpublished):
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/11a0287n-06.pdf

But the question is not how [officer] Beaver chose to access the area, but rather how an occupant of the vehicle could have accessed it. See Pino, 855 F.2d at 364. Here, Beaver testified that he could have accessed the hatchback area from inside the vehicle, but as a matter of convenience, he chose to open the hatch from outside.

In a “fighting words” case where the plaintiff was arrested for calling the officer a “bitch,” the officer arresting him for disorderly conduct had probable cause under the Fourth Amendment and could rely on the presumptive constitutionality of the statute under the First Amendment in making the arrest. Harrison v. Deane, 426 Fed. Appx. 175 (4th Cir. 2011).*

Defendant’s pat down was unjustified by reasonable suspicion. An officer was cruising an area of a “vague report” of shots fired a couple of blocks away and asked to talk to some young men who came up to him to talk. Two were more gregarious than defendant, who did not lean in to talk to the officer. Defendant declined to submit to a patdown after the other two did. “On the facts of this case, there is precious little to sustain the district court’s holding that Officer Gaines had reasonable, particularized suspicion of Massenburg such that a nonconsensual frisk was lawful under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480 (4th Cir. 2011).* Update: Noted in Federal Criminal Appeals Blog: The Fourth Circuit and the Fourth Amendment: If You Search Like a Redcoat You Can’t Use What You Find In Court.

Officers asked for consent of defendant’s hotel room which defendant initially refused. They said that they’d attempt to get a search warrant. “At that point, Bond exclaimed, ‘F-ck it!,’ grabbed the key card, and unlocked the door.” That was consent. United States v. Bond, 433 Fed. Appx. 441 (6th Cir. 2011)*.

Omissions from the affidavit were so minor that it did not undermine probable cause; nor did it suggest that the officer was trying to mislead the magistrate. Franks hearing denied. United States v. Robertson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90598 (E.D. Va. August 15, 2011).*

Telling the defendant in “an authoritative voice” more than once to keep his hands on the dashboard was a seizure. A reasonable person would believe he had no choice but to comply. United States v. Hodges, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40752 (N.D. Iowa April 14, 2011).*

While the police were targeting the co-defendant, defendant was in the car when the co-defendant delivered drugs to the CI. Defendant’s arrest was with probable cause. State v. Hackney, 2011 Ohio 1801, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 1553 (8th Dist. April 14, 2011).*

Defendant’s failure to just keep his hands out of his pockets, without more, did not amount to reasonable suspicion. Dawson v. State, 58 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).*

A jail cell search is not governed by the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff’s strip search claim was not ripe under PLRA. Russell v. City of Philadelphia, 428 Fed. Appx. 174 (3d Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

Defendant was seen parked in front of a bodega talking to two men through his open window in the winter, and he was stopped by the police for suspicion of a drug deal, but the men he was talking to were not stopped. The stop was without reasonable suspicion. United States v. Demings, 787 F. Supp. 2d 320 (D. N.J. 2011).*

An unreadable paper tag was reason for a stop. “The smell of urine and feces emanating from the vehicle, and the number [15] and appearance of the passengers, provided a further basis to continue the investigation” into human smuggling. United States v. Holguin, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143152 (N.D. Ga. April 11, 2011).*

Failure to file a motion to suppress before trial is a waiver [which the court overlooks here]. State v. Gagne, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 386 (May 31, 2011).*

Prison search was reasonable. Morgan v. Mississippi, 427 Fed. Appx. 347 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

Defendant’s consent was general to the whole house, and it was voluntary. United States v. Dooley, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59324 (N.D. Ga. June 2, 2011).*

The court finds the credibility question in favor of the defendant that he had a cell phone in his hand that he stuck in his waistband, not a gun, so the Terry stop was unreasonable. United States v. Howard, 787 F. Supp. 2d 330 (D. N.J. 2011).*

It is not a violation of any law, and appellant cites nothing in support, to not state in the search warrant what the police intend to do with blood taken in a DWI blood draw. State v. Webre, 347 S.W.3d 381 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011).*

Defendant has not shown that trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress would have altered the outcome, so no prejudice shown. State v. Layne, 2011 Ohio 3763, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 3193 (12th Dist. August 1, 2011).*

Defendant committed two traffic violations and was pulled over. The officer believed he made a furtive gesture by leaning when stopped, so he ordered defendant out of the car at gunpoint. After handcuffing defendant, he searched the car, and it was without reasonable suspicion for a weapon or probable cause for evidence. The officer could not even articulate the basis for handcuffing. State v. Hamilton, 2011 Ohio 3835; 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 3226 (8th Dist. August 4, 2011).*

Defendant’s apparent hand-to-hand drug transaction was justification for his stop. State v. Harris, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 599 (August 2, 2011).*