CA1: In a consent to search a pocket for ID, officers did not have to ignore drugs in the pocket

U.S. Marshals had an arrest warrant for Boyd who they found in a motel room. When they entered for a protective sweep, they also found defendant who had just stayed there with Boyd, an old friend he ran into in a bar the night before. Defendant was not compliant with their order to get down, and then he wouldn’t give his name or DOB. He consented to looking in his pocket for his ID, but there were drugs in the pocket, too. The scope of consent did not require the officers to ignore the obvious. United States v. Chaney, 647 F.3d 401 (1st Cir. 2011):

The tight confines of a pants pocket leave a searching hand little room for maneuvering and distinguishing between various objects that may be contained therein. Given consent to retrieve an object from such a cramped space, it is objectively reasonable to assume that the consent extends to the removal of items that either may constitute the object of the search and cannot be immediately identified or that obstruct further access to other items in the pocket. Nothing in Chaney’s exchange with Detective Newcomb suggests that he intended to withhold consent for these sorts of practical measures that are reasonable incidents to the search of a pocket. Chaney’s argument appears to be that, absent explicit permission to remove items other than evidence of identification, the detective was required to fish around in the pocket until he located an item that he could positively identify to be some form of identification and that could be removed without dislodging other items. The “typical reasonable person” would not so interpret Chaney’s exchange with the officer.

Plaintiff was stopped on suspicion of impersonating a police officer because of the stuff on his Chevy Tahoe. Shortly into the stop, plaintiff became angry and said “this is bullshit,” and said he had a concealed carry permit and he was a security guard. Because of his demeanor, the officer handcuffed him. Other officers arrived. A warrant was found for what they thought was plaintiff, and he was taken in. On further review, it was determined that plaintiff was the wrong person, and within two hours he was taken back to his house and property returned. His suit for excessive force for the too tight handcuffing was barred by qualified immunity. O’Malley v. City of Flint, 652 F.3d 662, 2011 FED App. 0194P (6th Cir. 2011).*