C.D.Cal.: A Gerstein/McLaughlin violation for delayed first appearance requires a showing of prejudice

A Gerstein/McLaughlin violation for delayed first appearance requires a showing of prejudice. Conners v. Lundy, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 254646 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2026):

The federal claim fares no better. Gerstein holds that “the Fourth Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to detention,” 420 U.S. at 126, and, absent extenuating circumstances, that determination must come within forty-eight hours of arrest, County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 57, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1991). Such a claim is cognizable on federal habeas review. See Benson v. Chappell, 958 F.3d 801, 823 (9th Cir. 2020). But relief requires prejudice: the constitutional error must have had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the outcome. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 90 L. Ed. 1557 (1946)). Petitioner identifies none. He points to no incriminating statement made during the three-day delay and no evidence obtained during it that was later used against him at trial. Cf. Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1071 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that “the appropriate remedy for a McLaughlin violation is the exclusion of the evidence in question—if it was ‘fruit of the poisonous tree'”), overruled on other grounds by Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003). Nor can he plausibly deny that there was probable cause for his arrest: he was convicted, and he does not challenge that conviction on substantive grounds. The alleged McLaughlin violation did not render his trial “fundamentally unfair.” Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 774 (9th Cir. 2001).

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