D.S.D.: No RS on totality when drug dog called for

The USMJ found that the officers abandoned the mission of the traffic stop (for Rodriguez purposes) when they called for the drug dog. So, the question is then whether there was reasonable suspicion at that point, and the answer is no. R&R adopted granting motion to suppress. United States v. Ruegge, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147661 (D.S.D. June 29, 2026).* A helpful discussion on reasonable suspicion on the totality:

Based on the totality of the circumstances here, Officers Dadah and Friedman did not have reasonable suspicion to extend the detention for a dog sniff. While the officers had observed driving behavior they believed to be suspicious, Mr. Ruegge offered an explanation, and neither Officer Dadah nor Officer Friedman testified that Mr. Ruegge’s explanation was inconsistent with anything they had observed during the stop or that his explanation raised their suspicions. Further, innocent drivers could just as well drive into and quickly out of a cul-de-sac at 9:30 p.m. in Rapid City’s higher-crime areas. As such, Mr. Ruegge’s driving behavior, without more, would not provide an articulable basis warranting a reasonable belief that his Suburban contained an illegal substance. See United States v. Stachowiak, 521 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that “the officer’s subjective perceptions of the driver’s nervous behavior or evasive driving standing alone may not be sufficient to constitute a reasonable, articulable suspicion”); United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1137-38 (8th Cir. 1998) (discounting the officer’s consideration that defendant traveled from a drug-source state because millions of innocent people reside in the source state and travel).

Also, although Officer Dadah saw a butane lighter on Mr. Ruegge’s console, he agreed that possessing a butane lighter in and of itself is not proof of drug activity. Docket 43 at 45. He also agreed that he did not observe slurred speech, smell the odor of alcohol or marijuana, or observe other indicators of drug use. Id. at 46-47. As the Eighth Circuit has explained, a person’s mere possession of an “innocent lighter” without other more revealing facts is worth little weight. See Betts, 88 F.4th at 775 (considering additional contextual facts, including meth-use indicators, with the presence of the butane lighter).

The Court gives similarly little weight to Mr. Ruegge’s inability to provide his friend’s street address. While an odd response to a routine question can cause suspicion, United States v. Murillo-Salgado, 854 F.3d 407, 416 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding reasonable suspicion to extend traffic stop based on odd responses to routine questions), not knowing a friend’s street address is not odd. Officer Dadah agreed, testifying, “I don’t think everyone knows all of their friends’ addresses.” Docket 43 at 42.

Further, even though Officer Dadah provided in his report that Mr. Ruegge was nervous and fidgety, Officer Dadah could not recall why he made that notation. Moreover, both officers testified at the suppression hearing that nothing in the body camera footage showed Mr. Ruegge acting nervous or fidgety. Both officers even commented during the encounter on how calm Mr. Ruegge was. But even if Mr. Ruegge showed signs of nervousness, including fidgeting, “nervousness is of limited significance in determining reasonable suspicion.” See Jones, 269 F.3d at 928. Therefore, any suspicion Mr. Ruegge’s behavior produced is minimal at best. See Beck, 140 F.3d at 1134 (“It certainly cannot be deemed unusual for a motorist to exhibit signs of nervousness when confronted by a law enforcement officer.”).

Finally, whether the information known by the officers is viewed alone or in combination with each other, the totality of the circumstances does not rise to the level of a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. Therefore, Magistrate Judge Wollmann properly determined “that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop.” Docket 44 at 61.