N.D.Ga.: Standing has to be shown for the time of the search, not at some time in the past

“Earl was required to show, not that he had an expectation of privacy in the home at some time, but that he had that expectation at the time of the search. United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1148 (11th Cir. 1997) (‘we are not persuaded that [the defendant] carried his burden of showing a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment … at the time of the search’); United States v. Sweat, 2007 WL 9717235, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 9, 2007) (‘The Court must determine whether Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time of the search, not whether Defendant ever had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property.’). His evidence showed only that he previously had access to the residence—not that he maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy when agents executed the warrant months later.” United States v. Earl, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145439 (N.D. Ga. July 1, 2026).

“A judge found probable cause to issue a warrant to search defendant Julien Giraud Jr.’s … home at 30 Elm Place in Irvington, New Jersey based on a detective’s sworn oral testimony. That testimony included statements that the detective should have known were inaccurate and omitted critical information that the judge should have been provided. Because the detective’s testimony was recklessly inaccurate and formed the basis of the judge’s determination of probable cause, all evidence obtained from the search of the residence will be suppressed.” “‘[O]missions are made with reckless disregard for the truth when an officer recklessly omits facts that any reasonable person would know that a judge would want to know.’” United States v. Giraud, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146800 (D.N.J. July 2, 2026).*