D.Mont.: LPN stop was long but also supported by outstanding warrant and then consent

Defendant’s stop for an inactive LPN was reasonable. The stop, however, was overlong and quickly turned into a drug investigation. There was also a warrant on the passenger. Defendant consented to it, and she was told she could refuse. United States v. Ditonno, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27422 (D. Mont. Feb. 10, 2026)*:

The only point at which her freedom of movement was meaningfully restricted was during the short drive to the storage unit, when she sat in the back of Hallam’s vehicle with her dog. (Id at 49:55-57:18). Hallam did not take her phone until he saw her texting. (Id. at 51:30-51:55). His request was reasonable given officer-safety and evidence-preservation concerns, and he told her he would “give it right back.” (Id. at 51:54-56). Otherwise, Griggs was never formally arrested, handcuffed, or physically restrained.

Although several officers were present, Griggs primarily interacted with Hallam and Fjetland, and usually with only one officer at a time. Officers were armed but never drew or displayed their weapons. The encounter occurred on a public roadway with passing traffic, not in a police-dominated environment. Officers advised her of her right not to answer questions and her right to refuse consent, and she chose to cooperate. She was never threatened with arrest if she declined. At the end of the encounter, law enforcement did not arrest Griggs and allowed her to drive the truck away. (Doc. 42-1 at 2).

As in Brown, the officers’ markedly different treatment of Ditonno reinforces that Griggs was not in custody. Griggs herself notes that there were “[flour different officers for two occupants, one who was summarily handcuffed and immobilized immediately.” (Doc. 57 at 5). That distinction underscores that Ditonno—not Griggs—was the individual in custody.

Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of finding that Griggs’s consent was voluntary.