N.D.Ga.: Whatever time is “reasonable” for a stop, the clock restarts when consent is granted

The stop was of reasonable duration before consent was sought. “Once Jaramillo consented to the search of the Tahoe, ‘the clock re-started for purposes of evaluating the reasonableness of the duration of the intrusion.’ Hernandez, 418 F.3d at 1210 (citation omitted).” United States v. Jaramillo, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91027 (N.D. Ga. April 25, 2014).

Defendant’s stop would have been valid on reasonable suspicion on the totality, but the trial court erroneously required probable cause. Reversed. People v. Yanez, 2014 IL App (1st) 123364, 2014 Ill. App. LEXIS 475 (June 30, 2014).*

Defense counsel did, in fact, fully pursue the search issue before the district court, so he couldn’t be ineffective for not. United States v. Cephas, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90675 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 2014).*

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