D.S.C.: RS is based on objective reasonableness, and don’t argue subjective intent contradictorily

For reasonable suspicion the standard is objective reasonableness. Here, the defendant argued subjective intent two ways: embracing it and rejecting it. United States v. Duggan, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206037 (D.S.C. Oct. 20, 2025)*:

6 In one breath, Defendant argues that subjective intent, such as Morrow’s courtesy of waiting for Tisdale to locate proof of insurance to avoid a citation, is irrelevant, while also chastising Morrow for his subjective belief that Tisdale and Defendant had drugs in the car. Compare (ECF No. 79, p. 2) (“An officer’s subjective intent-whether courteous or not-does not alter our constitutional protections. The test is objective reasonableness, not benevolence.”) with (ECF No. 51, p. 6) (“This ‘fishing expedition’ was because the officer-based on his own words-believed drugs were in the car.”). Defendant cannot wield Morrow’s subjective thoughts as both a sword and a shield. The law on this point is clear: Courts, when considering a Fourth Amendment challenge, are constrained to focus on objective reasonableness to the exclusion of any subjective intent. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)(“[T]hese cases foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved…. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).