In a judicial discipline case, a family court judge who had a 20 year practice of searching parties’ homes for marital property is censured. Search and seizure is an executive function, not a judicial one. This is just inappropriate. In re Goldston, 2021 W. Va. LEXIS 639 (Nov. 19, 2021):
Looking for things is a “search” by any sensible definition of the term. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968), “it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a ‘search'” (emphasis added). Accord Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 n.1 (2001) (“When the Fourth Amendment was adopted, as now, to ‘search’ meant ‘[t]o look over or through for the purpose of finding something; to explore; to examine by inspection; as, to search the house for a book; to search the wood for a thief.’ N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 66 (1828) (reprint 6th ed.1989).”); Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 510 (7th Cir. 2003), as amended on denial of reh’g (May 15, 2003) (“[T]he defendants went to the school for the specific purpose of gathering information, an activity that most certainly constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.” (emphasis added)); § 2.1(a) Definition of “searches” and “seizures,” 1 Search & Seizure § 2.1(a) (6th ed.) (“Under the traditional approach, the term ‘search’ is said to imply ‘some exploratory investigation, or an invasion and quest, a looking for or seeking out.'” (quoting C.J.S., Searches and Seizures § 1 (1952)).
Searches are an activity of the executive department. State ex rel. Parma Cmty. Gen. Hosp. v. O’Donnell, 2013-Ohio-2923, ¶ 7 (stating that “searches are executive in nature.”). “Indeed, searches are so quintessentially executive in nature that even a judge who participates in one acts ‘not *** as a judicial officer, but as an adjunct law enforcement officer.'” State ex rel. Hensley v. Nowak, 52 Ohio St. 3d 98, 99, 556 N.E.2d 171, 173 (1990) (per curiam) (quoting Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 327 (1979)) (holding that a writ of prohibition would not issue to restrain administrative searches because they are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial acts).
To say that searches are an executive activity is to announce no new principle of law. The United States Supreme Court assumed as much in 1979 when it rejected a conviction resulting from a search led by a town justice. According to the Supreme Court, the town justice in question “allowed himself to become a member, if not the leader, of the search party which was essentially a police operation.” Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. at 327 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court found that, in doing so, the town justice “was not acting as a judicial officer but as an adjunct law enforcement officer[,]” ibid., and that “[i]t [wa]s difficult to discern when he was acting as a ‘neutral and detached’ judicial officer and when he was one with the police and prosecutors in the executive seizure,” id. at 328 (emphasis added). Other courts, often following Lo-Ji Sales, routinely assume that searching is a law enforcement activity. United States v. Barnes, 895 F.3d 1194, 1202 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that “Lo-Ji Sales was an extreme case where the judicial officer allowed himself to become a member, if not the leader, of the search party which was essentially a police operation.” (internal quotation marks removed)); United States v. Clyburn, 806 F. Supp. 1247, 1252 (D.S.C. 1992), aff’d, 24 F.3d 613 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that, “[i]n Lo Ji Sales, the Court held that the judge who issued the warrant did not manifest that neutrality and detachment demanded of a judicial officer because the judge took an active law enforcement type role in conducting the search” (internal quotation marks removed)).
Under our system of government, judges may not exercise executive powers. The West Virginia Constitution declares that “[t]he legislative, executive and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct[.]” W. Va. Const. art. V, § 1 (emphasis added). The Constitution further specifies, in unmistakable terms, that no department “shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others” and forbids “any person [to] exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time[.]” Ibid. In light of these clear prohibitions, we hold that the West Virginia Constitution forbids a judicial officer to participate in a search because a search is an exercise of executive power. W. Va. Const. art. 5, § 1. Because Judge Goldston plainly engaged in such a search, we find that the so-called “view” was improper.
by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer and
Search and seizure law consultant
Little Rock, Arkansas
Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)