D.Mont.: PC for SW based on CIs was lacking, but not so bad GFE shouldn’t apply

The affidavit for search warrant actually was deficient in showing probable cause from the CIs and the concerned citizen, but it wasn’t so lacking in probable cause that the good faith exception should not apply. United States v. Stanley, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227388 (D. Mont. Dec. 3, 2020):

Viewing the information presented in Agent Bundy’s search warrant application as a whole, this Court finds that the statements of the three confidential sources are insufficient to warrant a finding of probable cause and the issuing judge erred in granting the search warrant. The affidavit is bereft of any basis of knowledge for the individuals’ concerns and information. No source explains how they know Stanley is using methamphetamine or storing methamphetamine at his residence for a supplier. The only first-hand observation evidence presented to support the suspicion is a tip about witnessing 3 ounces of methamphetamine in Stanley’s possession at his residence on a single occasion, several months before the search took place.

. . .

Here, the Court cannot say that it was entirely unreasonable for law enforcement to rely on the search warrant for Stanley’s residence. While the Court believes that the information contained in the search warrant affidavit fails in many respects to provide the proper corroborating evidence for information obtained from confidential sources, the warrant affidavit does provide at least a colorable argument for probable cause. The affidavit clearly describes information from multiple sources pointing to Stanley’s residence as a likely location for the storage of methamphetamine. The situation is analogous to that described in Elmore where the Ninth Circuit determined that although the issuing magistrate erred in finding sufficient probable cause to search in the warrant affidavit, it was nonetheless reasonable for law enforcement to conclude that the suspect was involved in a crime and act on the information contained in the warrant. “To hold that the police could not have relied in good faith on the magistrate’s determination here would be to ‘[p]enaliz[e] the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own,’ and thus, ‘cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.'” Elmore, 917 F.3d at 1078 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 921).

The Government points out that no evidence has been presented demonstrating that the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his role in issuing search warrant. Stanley does not address the Government’s argument that the good faith exception should apply in this case. Instead, the Defendant’s argument for suppression pertains mainly to the supposed facial deficiency of the search warrant and Stanley’s belief that Agent Bundy intentionally misled the magistrate with false statements or material omissions. As will be discussed below, the Court does not believe that Agent Bundy, at the time he submitted the search warrant application, made knowingly false statements in the application and no evidence has been presented demonstrating otherwise.

The argued facial deficiency in the search warrant also does not rise to the level required to make a law enforcement officer’s presumption in the warrant’s validity unreasonable. Stanley argues that because the search warrant incorrectly listed his residence as 1 Riverbend Estates instead of 22 River View Estates, the warrant was facially deficient to make an officer’s reliance on the warrant unreasonable. However, Stanley does not disagree with the Government’s argument that Stanley’s residence is the only occupied residence in the area described by the search warrant. Further, the Government has provided evidence that prior law enforcement reports have listed the house number as 1. (Doc. 22-1 at 4). It was therefore reasonable for law enforcement officers to believe that the address listed in the search warrant pertained to Stanley’s residence and, indeed, the intended residence was the one actually searched pursuant to the warrant. Exclusion is not required under these facts. See United States v. Mann, 389 F.3d 869, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2004).