Decedent was a mentally ill veteran who accidentally activated an at home alarm and police responded. He was ultimately shot and police came in, not responding to a wounded man but as a criminal. There was a plausible claim that any alleged emergency was police created. Finally, the law was clearly established for qualified immunity purposes. Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 17229 (2d Cir. May 29, 2020):
And when, eventually, the officers entered Chamberlain’s apartment, they did so not with a gurney and paramedics, or other equipment or personnel related to a possible health emergency, but with a Taser, a beanbag shotgun, and handguns. Instead of treating Chamberlain as a critically ill patient, the officers acted as though he were a criminal suspect. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 760, 764-66 (9th Cir. 2009) (denying summary judgment on unlawful entry claim where officers claimed medical emergency but, instead of exhibiting care and concern for the plaintiff upon entry, handcuffed him at gunpoint). These facts as alleged in the complaint and related documents, and viewed in the light most favorable to Appellant, give rise to the plausible inference that the officers knew that Chamberlain was not in need of urgent medical assistance but chose to enter his home anyway. Chase Grp. All. LLC, 620 F.3d at 150; see also Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392-93; Klump, 536 F.3d at 117.
The fact that Chamberlain was classified as an “emotionally disturbed person” does not alter this analysis. It was alleged, and is undisputed, that the officers were aware from the start of their encounter with Chamberlain that he had a history of mental illness. It is plausibly alleged that rather than serving as justification for forcing entry into his apartment, that knowledge would have led a reasonable, experienced officer to conclude that Chamberlain’s conduct—which eventually included incoherent statements and erratic behavior—was not symptomatic of a medical emergency but rather a long-standing psychiatric or emotional condition. See Klump, 536 F.3d at 117 (considering “the totality of the circumstances confronting law enforcement agents in the particular case” (internal citation omitted)). It seems to us that a reasonable officer likely would have known—or at least learned quickly during the course of the encounter—that the officer’s actions were exacerbating Chamberlain’s condition. Thus, on the facts alleged, the officers did not have probable cause to enter Chamberlain’s apartment merely based on his pre-existing medical or psychiatric condition of which they were aware. See Welsh, 446 U.S. at 749-50 (explaining the “heavy burden” that police bear “when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches”). Appellant thus plausibly alleged that the officers’ warrantless entry was not justified by a threat of immediate danger to Chamberlain.
Neither do the Amended Complaint and supplemental recordings suggest that the officers had a credible concern that Chamberlain posed a risk of harm to a third party. During the course of his lengthy standoff with the police, Chamberlain mentioned two women: Lynette and Loretta, but he also mentioned the President, Vice President, and Attorney General of the United States. Neither the Life Aid operator nor the officers on the scene asked Chamberlain whether another person was in his apartment. Under the facts as alleged, a reasonable experienced officer could have seen these one-off references as part of an unbalanced tirade by a highly agitated person with mental illness rather than a conversation with actual but unseen, unheard, and unknown persons in his presence. Thus, based on the allegations before the district court as augmented by the audio and video recordings, the officers’ warrantless entry cannot be justified on the ground that Chamberlain posed a risk of harm to a third party in his apartment.
To the extent any non-medical exigency existed during the entry, as noted repeatedly above, it is plausible that the officers themselves created it. “[I]n most circumstances, the exigent circumstances rule should not apply where the police, without a warrant or any legally sound basis for a warrantless entry, threaten that they will enter without permission unless admitted.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 462 n.4 (2011) (deciding on other grounds because no such threat was made). While officers may “knock on a door as any private citizen might” without a warrant, they “may not gain entry by actually violating or threatening to violate the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Moreno, 701 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2012); cf. United States v. Lucas, 462 F. App’x 48, 50 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) (noting that an officer did not “create the exigency” relied on to enter an apartment because he “made no threat to enter the apartment”). Here, as alleged and as reflected in the recordings, the police threatened and attempted objectionable conduct by insisting that if Chamberlain did not open his door, they would force entry. See, e.g., J. App’x 213 (Transcript of Clip 203) (“[T]hey’re gonna make entry anyway.”); id. at 219 (“You want me to break your door down is that what you want?”). As a result, any non-medical exigent circumstances may well have been of the officers’ own making, resulting from their direct threats to enter Chamberlain’s apartment forcibly, and not a permissible basis for entry.
by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer and
Search and seizure law consultant
Little Rock, Arkansas
Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)