C.D.Cal.: Habeas case seeks to enjoin state prosecution, and it is barred by Younger abstention

Petitioner’s 2241 habeas case seeks to enjoin his state prosecution, and it is barred by Younger abstention. Bibbs v. United States, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87057 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2020):

In addition, all four Younger abstention criteria are satisfied here. First, Petitioner has an “ongoing state judicial proceeding” as he states he is “awaiting trial.” Second, the resolution of state criminal proceedings clearly implicates important state interests. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49, 107 S. Ct. 353, 93 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1986) (“The right to formulate and enforce penal sanctions is an important aspect of the sovereignty retained by the States.” (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 46)); see also Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432 (“Proceedings necessary for the vindication of important state policies or for the functioning of the state judicial system also evidence the state’s substantial interest in the litigation.”). Third, Petitioner has “an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges,” either at the trial or appellate level, and there appears to be nothing to prevent Petitioner from doing so. See Arevalo, 882 F.3d at 765. Petitioner could file a bail review, or can appeal the trial court’s bail determination to the California Court of Appeal. Fourth, habeas relief from this Court in the form of release would have the “practical effect” of enjoining the state court proceedings, and would release Petitioner prior to the adjudication of his criminal case. See Bowell v. Paramo, No. CV-17-9313-TJH-MAA, 2018 WL 4735721, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV-17-9313-TJH-MAA, 2018 WL 4698250 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2018), certificate of appealability denied, No. 18-56319, 2018 WL 6978341 (9th Cir. Dec. 20, 2018) (finding if the Court were to grant emergency release, “it necessarily would entail interference because the ongoing state proceeding effectively would be terminated” (citing San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Committee v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding interference under Younger where the federal relief sought would “involve the federal courts in terminating or truncating” the ongoing state proceeding (citation omitted)))).

Finally, Petitioner identifies no “extraordinary circumstances” warranting the Court’s interference as an exception under Younger. Petitioner does not allege he has been the subject of harassment or that his continued prosecution is in bad faith and without hope of obtaining a valid conviction. See Brown, 676 F.3d at 901. While Petitioner asserts various claims under his “inadequacy of courts and counsel” claim, see dkt. 1 at 6-9, even liberally construed, these conclusory allegations are unsupported and do not demonstrate bad faith or harassment on the part of the prosecution. See Collins v. People of the State of California, No. CV-16-03703-DMG (KS), 2016 WL 4161973, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2016), judgment entered, 2016 WL 4149942 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2016) (“Federal intervention cannot be predicated on conclusory allegations and Petitioner provides no proof that his continued prosecution by the state actually stems from bad faith and harassment and not some other basis”.). Furthermore, Petitioner has not shown he will suffer “irreparable injury” by waiting until the state court proceedings are concluded to bring his claims in this Court. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 46 (holding “irreparable injury is insufficient unless it is ‘both great and immediate'”).

Accordingly, federal court abstention is required. Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54. The Petition is, therefore, subject to dismissal.

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