PA: No right of privacy in non-privileged prisoner mail under state constitution

Pennsylvania holds that there is no right of privacy in non-privileged prisoner mail under either the Fourth Amendment or state constitution, questions separately analyzed and discussed. The law is well settled. Commonwealth v. Moore, 2007 PA Super 207, 928 A.2d 1092 (2007).

Plaintiff who was prosecuted but placed in pre-trial diversion program (“Pretrial Intervention Program”) in New Jersey sued for unlawful seizure. There was probable cause for the search warrant, and he loses on the merits. Orlowski v. Borough of Sayreville, 2007 N.J. Super. LEXIS 237 (July 11, 2007) (Comment: This case falls in the category of “no good deed goes unpunished.” He got a great break from the prosecutor in diverting him, and he shows his appreciation by filing a BS case against the police that depended entirely on his being able to show no probable cause for the warrant, a prospect that was less than dim. Heck v. Humphrey was apparently not raised in defense that diversion was not a sufficiently successful outcome in the criminal case to permit the civil case. As a matter of policy, Heck maybe should be extended this far; at least the defense should have raised it. [I only assume they did not because the court never mentions it.] My point is this: Filing civil cases like this is going to make that local prosecutor far less likely to offer diversion to other defendants in the future, so the plaintiff, actually his lawyer, quite literally “cut off his nose to spite his face.” As for this plaintiff, he better hope he does not get arrested again in that jurisdiction.

Plaintiff’s jury verdict for defendants’ euthanizing her dogs after seizing them was sustained. SPCA was acting under color of law when it seized plaintiff’s dogs. Prior appeal only held that plaintiff did not have an expectation of privacy in the allegedly abandoned premises. It did not decide that plaintiff’s rights were not violated by the seizure and killing of the animals, which the jury found that they were. Jury verdict affirmed, but punitive damages award set aside. Snead v. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Pa., 2007 PA Super 204, 929 A.2d 1169 (2007):

[*P19] Here, Snead’s Section 1983 claims are grounded in the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Snead claims that SPCA’s euthanizing of the dogs constituted an unreasonable “seizure” in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights; and, additionally, that she was deprived of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. It is conceded that SPCA was acting under color of state law when it took possession of and euthanized Snead’s dogs; therefore, the first prerequisite for making out a Section 1983 claim is satisfied. (Trial court opinion, 2/1/06 at 3, 5; notes of testimony, 7/11/05 at 84.)

A seizure of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interest in that property. See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61-65, 113 S.Ct. 538, 543, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992). A seizure of property sufficient to implicate Fourth Amendment rights occurs where the seizure is unreasonable. Id. In determining whether a government seizure violates the Fourth Amendment, the seizure must be scrutinized for its overall reasonableness. Id.

Wagner, supra at 1254. The killing of Snead’s dogs is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Van Patten v. City of Binghamton, 137 F. Supp. 2d 98, 107 (N.D. N.Y. 2001) (citation omitted). However, a seizure alone does not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation; the question is whether this seizure was reasonable under the circumstances. Id., citing Soldal, supra, 506 U.S. at 61-62.