Alleged harassing activity by police of following the plaintiff around is not a seizure. Christensen v. County of Boone, 483 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 2007):
In the present case, the plaintiffs allege that Deputy Krieger followed them in his squad car as they drove on Boone County roads and sat outside businesses that the couple patronized. This alleged behavior did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. Driving on public streets is one of the activities during which a person does not enjoy a legitimate interest in privacy. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”). Nor can individuals reasonably expect privacy in the parking lot of a business. See Dunkel, 900 F.2d at 107. In observing the couple’s public movements, Deputy Krieger did not conduct a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Nor were the plaintiffs ever “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. We recognize that, in certain circumstances, a Fourth Amendment “seizure” may occur when police intentionally restrict the freedom of a person to move about in public. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989). For example, if law enforcement officers attempt to stop a fleeing suspect by forcing his automobile off the road, they have conducted a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 597. This type of seizure occurs, however, only if two conditions are met. First, the officer must, through physical force or a show of authority, “communicate[] to a reasonable person that he [is] not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Packer, 15 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 1994). Second, when the officer’s encounter with the plaintiff is nonphysical, the plaintiff must have submitted to the show of authority to establish that a seizure has taken place. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (“An arrest requires either physical force (as described above) or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority.” (emphasis omitted)).
In light of these requirements, the theory that the plaintiffs were “seized” when Deputy Krieger followed them in his squad car is inconsistent with the allegations of the complaint. The alleged actions by Deputy Krieger were nonphysical. …
Defendant’s girlfriend’s statement to the police that she could not consent to a search without conferring with her boyfriend first did not implicate Randolph. When he showed up, he freely consented. United States v. Wells, 231 Fed. Appx. 243 (4th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).
Court probation officers who were separate from the state probation system still had the authority to conduct probation searches because their regulations were similar to Griffin‘s. United States v. Godsey, 224 Fed. Appx. 896 (11th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).
Recognizing the “tension” in civil rights cases between a Franks challenge and the liberal pleading requirements of F.R.C.P. 8, the plaintiff was able to state a claim for relief and survive summary judgment on an allegation that there was an inadequate showing of probable cause for a search warrant. Carthage v. Sumpter Twp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19452 (E.D. Mich. March 20, 2007).*
Excessive force claim was stated for throwing plaintiff down and kneeing him in the back unnecessarily. Warren v. Township of Derry, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19537 (M.D. Pa. March 20, 2007):
In the action sub judice, plaintiffs allege that Shank and other officers n10 pulled Samuel from his vehicle, threw him to the ground, and kneed him in the back. Plaintiffs further claim that the officers grabbed Olandis, forced him to the police car, and slammed his head against the hood. (See Doc. 40, Ex. A. at 32-37. While “[n]ot every push or shove … is constitutionally unreasonable,” Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 821 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)), there is sufficient record evidence to suggest that the force used was excessive. The record is devoid of evidence that plaintiffs posed a threat to officer safety or resisted arrest. See Gravely, 2007 WL 655290, at *2. Nor were plaintiffs suspected of a violent or serious crime. Id. Accordingly, in the context of the procedural posture of the case, see supra Part II, the court finds that plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie claim of excessive force, and defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be denied as to this claim.
