Pager could not be seized during a patdown, but it could be in a search incident

Defendant’s pager was unlawfully seized during a Terry frisk because it could not be a weapon, but its seizure was inevitable as a part of a search incident to defendant’s arrest. Alternatively, it was harmless. United States v. Garcia, 496 F.3d 495, 2007 FED App. 0299P (6th Cir. 2007).*

Under the category “If it’s a federal case from Kansas, it involves a traffic stop and reasonable suspicion”: The question of standing need not be reached if the court determines that the defendant would lose on the merits. The stop was valid because it was based on a traffic stop. The search was arguably invalid as an inventory. While the search occurred too soon to be called an inventory, it would, however, have inevitably later be conducted as an inventory, so the Fourth Amendment was not violated. The officers searched a shoe box. United States v. Nanez-Lopez, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57372 (D. Kan. August 6, 2007).*

Defendant driving his mother’s car with her permission had standing to challenge its search. There was a substantial basis for the issuance of the search warrant for the car because of surveillance information and informants who corroborated each other. United States v. Mendoza, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57285 (D. Id. August 6, 2007).*

Officer had reasonable suspicion because of defendant’s drug prior and common association with known drug dealers. United States v. Mateo-Vera, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57212 (D. Or. August 1, 2007):

Here, Officer Broderick possessed information that defendant had been convicted of delivery of a controlled substance, that defendant socialized with an individual who had a lengthy history of drug and firearms offenses, and that a confidential informant informed Sergeant O’Toole that a Hispanic male who drove a gold-colored SUV was dealing methamphetamine from his residence at the Harbor Ridge Apartments, where defendant lived. Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Broderick reasonably suspected criminal activity. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274-75 (2002); United States v. Torres-Sanchez, 83 F.3d 1123, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 1996).

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