CA7: “Lawyering up” doesn’t preclude officers asking for consent

Defendant consented to a search of his car and his computer at home after he was arrested for showing up after an internet chat with a fake 15 year old girl. He was told that he could consent or the officers would get a warrant [which would almost certainly be granted, except what would they need the computer to prove?]. He consented, saying “what’s done is done.” He also invoked his right to counsel, but a request for consent is not an “interrogation” barred by Miranda. United States v. Knope, 655 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2011):

Knope also asserts that his consent was invalid because he signed the consent form after he invoked his right to counsel. He cites Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981), where the Supreme Court held that police cannot continue an interrogation after the accused invokes his right to counsel. Knope’s argument is foreclosed, however, by this court’s holding that “a consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda.” United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 335 (7th Cir. 1994). Indeed, we rejected nearly identical arguments in Shlater and LaGrone. Knope’s consent was not invalid on these grounds.

Defendant is a doctor accused of running a “pill mill.” She has two residences, and the government investigators concluded that she likely had large amounts of cash in her two residences. The search warrant for her house was validly issued. She’s proceeding pro se. In re Hoover’s Residence, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92783 (N.D. W.Va. August 19, 2011).*