NM: Prosecutor’s question about PC for arrest warrant being found improper, but not reversible error here

It was improper for the prosecutor to question the arresting officer about the judge finding probable cause and issuing the arrest warrant. But, it was not so flagrant here to require reversal. State v. Aragon, 2026 N.M. LEXIS 81 (May 11, 2026):
https://nmonesource.com/nmos/nmsc/en/538190/1/document.do

b. Eliciting testimony from police officers that implied Defendant’s guilt had been determined

P80 Defendant contends that it was error for the prosecutor to elicit testimony detailing the warrant process, arguing the “State’s intent … was to establish the police, prosecution, and courts had all determined [Defendant] was the murderer and the jury should defer to their judgment,” which is improper. However, Defendant offers no argument about how this purported error affected the verdict.

P81 With regard to the testimony about the warrant process, one of the two exchanges at issue is as follows:

Q. Tell us about the arrest warrant process, generally.

A. So arrest warrant, typically what we have to do is we have to present or produce an affidavit and establish enough probable cause in order to present to a judge. And once we've established the affidavit, we have placed the charges on the criminal complaint and then those are submitted to a judge, whether magistrate or district, to obtain the arrest warrant. It has to be filed, as well.

The other exchange described the process for obtaining a search warrant.

P82 In State v. Baca, this Court found prosecutorial misconduct where, “in an effort to rebut [the defendant’s] argument that the evidence was not sufficient to convict, the prosecutor stated that a magistrate judge had considered the evidence at a preliminary hearing and had determined that there was probable cause to believe [the defendant] committed the crimes.” 1995-NMSC-045, ¶ 36, 120 N.M. 383, 902 P.2d 65. Thus, a “prosecutor may not imply that questions of guilt already have been decided by a judicial officer” because doing so “effectively usurps the function of the jury.” Id. ¶ 37 (text only) (citations omitted).

P83 Unlike the prosecutor in Baca, the prosecutor in this case did not tell the jury that “the judge had considered the evidence … and had determined that there was probable cause to believe Defendant committed the crimes.” Id. ¶ 36. Instead, the prosecutor elicited testimony about what information must be submitted to a judge “to obtain the arrest warrant.” While not an express statement that a judge determined there was cause to believe Defendant committed the crimes, as in Baca, the testimony nevertheless implies that a judge believed there was sufficient evidence to arrest Defendant. While we conclude that this implication was improper, we cannot say that the exchange shocks the conscience of the Court or renders Defendant’s conviction fundamentally unfair. The jury instructions are of course quite clear about the required standard for conviction. See State v. Benally, 2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 21, 131 N.M. 258, 34 P.3d 1134 (“We presume that the jury followed the instructions given by the trial court.”). Defendant’s unpreserved argument on this point does not shock this Court’s conscience and does not require a new trial due to prosecutorial misconduct.