CA9: Use of Taser in dart-mode wasn’t excessive force because it was justified

“An officer’s use of a Taser in dart-mode ‘constitute[s] an intermediate, significant level of force.’ … But under the Graham factors, Officer Swindling’s brief Taser use was justified under the circumstances. First, Sharif had assaulted his daughter’s mother; stolen a kitchen knife, which he claimed he would use to take his own life if she called law enforcement; fled from police; ran toward an officer with the knife prompting the use of lethal force; and did not drop the knife once on the ground. Thus, he was engaged in a violent, severe criminal spree.” Sharif v. Swindling, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 3001 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2025).*

This fentanyl search warrant was particular for the address and included campers on the property. A camper was validly searched. Garcia v. State, 2025 WY 17 (Feb. 10, 2025).*

CoA denied on petitioner’s 2255: “Here, reasonable jurists would agree that Roberson was given a chance to raise his claim in state court and that the presentation of his claim was not frustrated. Notably, even if Roberson could show that errors occurred during the trial court’s adjudication of his motion to suppress, he was given an opportunity to raise those issues on appeal. Further, Stone does not require ‘an inquiry into the adequacy of the procedure actually used to resolve [the Fourth Amendment] claim.’ … And Stone remains good law after the enactment of the AEDPA, as this court has continued to apply it to bar review of Fourth Amendment claims. …” Roberson v. Eller, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 2731 (6th Cir. Feb. 3, 2025).*