DC (en banc): Flight in a high crime area alone isn’t RS

“With this opinion, we first reaffirm the division’s [Mayo v. United States, 284 A.3d 403 (D.C. 2022)] predicate holding, uncontested by the government, that Mr. Mayo was seized when the GRU officer dove to tackle him and grabbed his foot, even though he got away. This holding is compelled by Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (2021), which effectively overruled this court’s decision in Henson v. United States, 55 A.3d 859 (D.C. 2012). Second, we reject the government’s interpretation of Wardlow as authorizing police to make Terry stops whenever they perceive anyone seeking to evade them in an area labeled ‘high crime.’ We hold, in keeping with our understanding of Wardlow, that (1) in assessing reasonable articulable suspicion, flight must be examined in the context of the totality of the circumstances and (2) general locational crime evidence, if relevant and nonconclusory, may provide context for police observations of ambiguous conduct, but its appropriate weight will turn on its quality and specificity. Applying this framework, we reaffirm the division’s conclusion that Mr. Mayo’s rights under the Fourth Amendment were violated. Lastly, because the government did not seek en banc review on this question, we reinstate the division’s holding that the items of physical evidence subsequently recovered by the police from Mr. Mayo’s person and in the area of the chase were fruits of his unlawful seizure that must be suppressed.” Mayo v. United States, 2024 D.C. App. LEXIS 195 (May 23, 2024) (en banc).