GA: Officer’s request for consent to search didn’t require Miranda warning

Defendant’s questions about his arrest and the officer’s request for consent did not require a Miranda warning. State v. Pauldo, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 447 (June 16, 2020). N.9:

In those cases, the courts have generally reasoned that asking for consent to search is not an interrogation in violation of Miranda, that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement, and therefore, that the Fifth Amendment provides no basis for suppressing the evidence found in the search. See, e.g., United States v. Calvetti, 836 F3d 654, 663 (II) (A) (6th Cir. 2016) (consent to search home after invocation of right to counsel); United States v. Smith, 3 F3d 1088, 1098 (V) (B) (1) (7th Cir. 1993) (“We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation.” (citations and punctuation omitted)); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F2d 1563, 1568 (I) (B) (10th Cir. 1993) (consent to search storage unit); State v. Morato, 619 NW2d 655 (¶¶ 23-24). (S.D. 2000) (consent to search truck); State v. Crannell, 750 A2d 1002, 1009 (Vt. 2000), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Brillon, 955 A2d 1108 (Vt. 2008) (same); State v. Hooten, 2013 WL 5436712, at *35-36 (II) (A) (Tenn. Crim. App., decided Sept. 27, 2013) (consent to search car); State v. Baumeister, 723 P2d 1049, 1050-51 (Or. App. 1986) (same). But see State v. Britain, 752 P2d 37, 39 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (viewing “a request for a consent to search, after the right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation” and as one ground for suppressing evidence); Kreijanovsky v. State, 706 P2d 541, 546 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985) (concluding under Miranda that “once an individual in custody requests an attorney, interrogating officers must not seek further consensual admissions, whether in the form of confession, consent to search, or waiver of other privileges”).