S.D.Ga.: Roadblock on interstate highway to nab fleeing bank robber was reasonable, almost per se

A roadblock set up to catch a fleeing bank robber was constitutional, and the court denied subpoenas on the constitutional question before the suppression hearing. “See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32. 44 (2000) (‘[T]he Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to … catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route.’).” At the suppression hearing, the defendant tried to show the traffic backup made it unconstitutional, but the court finds that traffic backing up for 10 miles with a 20-30 minute delay alone does not make it so. Merrett v. Dempsey, 1993 WL 774466 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 1993), aff’d, Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547 (11th Cir. 1995). The tracking device gave probable cause. United States v. Rodger, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65850 (S.D. Ga. April 16, 2010):

[T]his exception emphasized by the Supreme Court in Edmond is applicable to the facts of this case. Indeed, an armed robbery suspect is no doubt a dangerous criminal, and the record establishes that police knew that the suspect was fleeing west on I-20 based on the signal from the electronic tracking device. See United States v. Abbott, 265 Fed. App’x 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that a roadblock set up to catch a bank robber was constitutional where, inter alia, the defendant’s vehicle was located in dense traffic where electronic tracking devices embedded in stolen money suggested the car was to be found). The fact that Defendant matched the description of the robbery suspect and the presence of the electronic tracking device in his vehicle also undermines Defendant’s argument that police did not possess “individualized suspicion” to investigate him further.