D.P.R.: Exclusionary rule does not apply to revo of federal supervised release

Exclusionary rule does not apply to revocation of federal supervised release, analogizing parole and probation revocation cases. United States v. Jimenez-Torres, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65741 (D. P.R. June 30, 2010):

In his motion to suppress, Jimenez-Torres first attempts to distinguish his case by arguing that Scott is specifically about parole hearings and there is no parole in the federal system. See Docket No. 28 at page 5. The Defendant adds that different from parole proceedings, federal revocation proceedings are adversarial, and thus the exclusionary rule should apply therein. Id. at 4.

Faced with the same objection, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that “parole and supervised release are ‘analogous contexts.'” Armstrong, 187 F.3d at 394 (citing United States v. Woodrup, 86 F.3d 359, 361 (4th Cir.1996)) (holding exclusionary rule did not apply to federal supervised release revocation proceedings after drugs and weapons were discovered in defendant’s car during routine traffic stop). Accordingly, the court in Armstrong found that “[a]lthough supervised release revocation proceedings, unlike parole revocation proceedings, do take place before a judge, they are characterized by the same ‘flexibility’ that the Supreme Court found significant in Scott.” Armstrong, 187 F.3d at 394. See also Scott 524 U.S. at 365 (“The exclusionary rule, … , is incompatible with the traditionally flexible, administrative procedures of parole revocation).

Moreover, the District Court of Massachusetts, analyzing a similar inquiry to the one before this Court, stated that “[a]s the standards and interests involved are essentially the same in the parole, probation, and supervised release revocation contexts, the reasoning underlying cases concerning the admissibility of evidence in one type of hearing are applicable to the other two as well.” Gravina, 906 F.Supp. at 53 n. 1 ….