IL follows Hudson under state constitution in knock-and-announce violation

The Illinois Court of Appeals follows Hudson in not applying the exclusionary rule to a no-knock violation under its state constitution, finding that the state Supreme Court would probably follow Hudson. People v. Glorioso, 398 Ill. App. 3d 975, 338 Ill. Dec. 627, 924 N.E.2d 1153 (2010)*:

We turn to the second prong–long-standing state constitutional law. Here, we find little to suggest that the supreme court would conclude (or that we ought to conclude) that adopting Hudson would violate established precedent. Although the supreme court applied the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations in Ouellette and Condon, the court in each case assumed, without any discussion, that the exclusionary rule applied under both the federal and the state constitutions. See Condon, 148 Ill. 2d at 108; Ouellette, 78 Ill. 2d at 521-22. While such an unspoken assumption was entirely reasonable under the circumstances, it is hardly the stuff of which “state tradition and values” (Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d at 314) are made. Moreover, because the Condon and Ouellete courts did not have to decide whether to deviate from fourth amendment precedent in construing article I, section 6, their opinions say nothing about what they would have done had the Supreme Court previously decided that the federal exclusionary rule did not apply to knock-and-announce violations. Thus, to decide whether anything in our case law now requires excluding evidence seized in violation of the knock-and-announce rule, we must look elsewhere. But when we do, we find little.

Apparently, the only time that the supreme court has deviated from lockstep in its construction of the state exclusionary rule is Krueger. As we have noted, although that case did involve an unconstitutional no-knock search, the type of the search was not pertinent to the court’s decision. Rather, that decision was based on the distinction between the actions of a magistrate issuing a warrant in an individual case and a statute that has the potential to violate the constitutional rights of many people without any redress. This distinction militates against departing from lockstep for knock-and-announce violations. Although these infringements of constitutional rights are committed by police officers rather than magistrates, either type “‘affects one person at a time,'” in contrast to legislation authorizing unconstitutional searches, which “‘may affect thousands or millions and will almost always affect more than one.'” Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d at 73, quoting Krull, 480 U.S. at 365, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 385, 107 S. Ct. at 1175 (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ.). Moreover, whatever one makes of the debate in Hudson over the effectiveness of civil suits as relief against violations of the knock-and-announce rule, there is no doubt that such relief is available. By contrast, as Krueger stressed, no relief is available against a legislature that has authorized unconstitutional searches and seizures. See Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d at 75.