D.Utah: No 4A requirement for a police car in the field to have internet access to more speedily check records without radioing it in

There is no constitutional requirement for a police car in the field to have internet access to more speedily check records without radioing it in. Also, he testified that rural service is spotty. United States v. Lopez-Casillas, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67787 (D. Utah May 3, 2017):

First, Defendant argues that Trooper Withers’ call to dispatch for criminal history and registration information regarding Defendant and his car unreasonably extended the duration of the stop. Defendant asserts that Trooper Withers could have more quickly resolved the stop by simply using his patrol car’s laptop to look up the relevant information. The court disagrees.

The court first notes that it is not clear from the record that Trooper Withers had an available internet connection that would allow him to access the requested information. He testified that internet availability on the section of I-70 where the stop took place is “real spotty” and he was unsure whether a connection was available at the time of the stop. (Tr. 52:20 – 54:7). But even assuming that Trooper Withers had a sufficient internet connection to conduct a records check, there is no indication here that dispatch took any longer to obtain the information than Trooper Withers would have under the circumstances. In fact, it is likely that Trooper Withers would have taken longer to obtain the requested information if he were required to do so while investigating both the window tint violation and suspected drug-trafficking. In any event, absent any evidence of unreasonable delay or dilatory motive, the court must conclude that it was entirely reasonable for Trooper Withers to delegate the records check task to dispatch. On this record, a contrary conclusion would amount to “unrealistic second-guessing” of police conduct in a “swiftly developing situation.” See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985); id. at 686-87 (“A creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some [less intrusive] means by which objectives of the police might have been accomplished. But … [that] does not, itself, render the search unreasonable.”); United States v. Lovelady, No. 2:13-cr-00044-RJS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72816, 2014 WL 2208158, at *13 (D. Utah May 28, 2014) (unpublished) (“[T]he law does not require that an officer’s conduct be perfect, or perfectly efficient, during a traffic stop.”).

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