IA: A claim of officer safety has to be objectively justified by the record; Rodriguez followed under state constitution

Iowa adopts Rodriguez under state constitution after a lengthy comparison of its own cases and cases from around the country. A claim of officer safety has to be objectively justified by the record; merely stating it doesn’t make it so. State v. Coleman, 2017 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 11 (Feb. 10, 2017), overruling Jackson v. State, 315 N.W.2d 766 (Iowa 1982):

We recognize, however, that officer safety is a legitimate and weighty interest in the context of traffic stops. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 336-37 (1977) (per curiam). Yet, as the Supreme Court stated in Knowles, the safety concerns arising out of a potential traffic citation are “a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest.” 525 U.S. at 117, 119 S. Ct. at 487, 142 L. Ed. 2d at 498. Nonetheless, in Mimms, the Supreme Court held that an officer can direct a driver to get out of the car to ensure the officer’s safety. 434 U.S. at 110-11, 98 S. Ct. at 333, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 337.

Yet, for a more intrusive Terry-type stop, reasonable suspicion is constitutionally required before the officers may engage in a pat-down search. United States v. Clark, 24 F.3d 299, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Coley, 974 F. Supp. 41, 44 (D.C. Dist. 1997). There is no categorical approach to pat-down searches. The validity of a pat-down search, an important part of ensuring officer safety, depends upon the facts of each case. See Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1022 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting Terry-type pat-down based on “conclusory references to ‘officer safety'”).

The same is true in the context of extending the duration of an automobile stop when the underlying problem has been resolved. While in most extended traffic-stop cases an officer safety claim has not been asserted, in cases where officer safety has been raised, the courts have repeatedly rejected generalized, unsubstantiated claims related to officer safety as a basis for extending a traffic stop. See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 463 F.3d 27, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2006) (conclusory argument of officer safety not based on facts insufficient); Smith, 37 F. Supp. 3d at 812-13 (insufficient evidence of threat to safety to justify extended stop); State v. McCaulley, 831 N.E.2d 474, 476-77 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (no safety reasons for detention of driver in back seat of squad car). Here, there is no indication in the record that the officer feared for his safety. Indeed, the officer allowed the unhandcuffed driver to accompany him back to the vehicle when the officer conducted the search.

Further, our holding does not increase the risks of harm to officers, but in fact lessens it. Under the result in this case, the officer is required to allow the driver to go on his or her way after the resolution of the reason for the stop. This can be accomplished by a brief gesture, an announcement from the back of the vehicle, or a brief conversation at the driver’s window. In this case, it would have simply only required the officer to say “good-bye” to the driver and allow him to return to the car. In fact, any increased officer danger arises from continuing the detention of the driver while the license and warrant checks are conducted. Thus, the very outcome sought by the State in this case would increase danger to officers, not lessen it. Officer safety might be a valid concern when tethered to a suspect’s continuing detention, but not when the suspect is free to go. The State is not entitled to relief from an exigency of its own creation.

As indicated above, it is not clear whether Jackson was a Fourth Amendment or article I, section 8 case. In any event, to the extent that Jackson is inconsistent with our holding today, we overrule it. We conclude that when the reason for a traffic stop is resolved and there is no other basis for reasonable suspicion, article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution requires that the driver must be allowed to go his or her way without further ado.

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