NC: Def waived issue of RS for appeal by arguing PC instead; on merits, there was RS anyway

Defendant abandons his argument that there was no reasonable suspicion for his stop by providing no argument on reasonable suspicion and instead focusing on probable cause. Going to the record, however, the court finds reasonable suspicion for the stop because of an apparent hand-to-hand transaction at 4 am in a “drug corridor” between defendant’s car and a pedestrian who walked up to it. State v. Evans, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 18 (Jan. 17, 2017):

In the heading to defendant’s appellate argument regarding the denial of his suppression motion, defendant asserts that “there was no reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify stopping [defendant].” However, defendant does not set forth any legal argument or citation to authority to support this contention, which is therefore deemed abandoned. See N.C. R. App. P. Rule 28(a) (2015) (“Issues not presented and discussed in a party’s brief are deemed abandoned.”). Defendant’s appellate brief instead focuses upon the fact that the trial court applied a probable cause standard, rather than reasonable suspicion, to the question of whether the brief investigative seizure of defendant violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Defendant correctly asserts that the proper standard for determining the constitutionality of a traffic stop is reasonable suspicion. However, defendant fails to acknowledge that probable cause is a more stringent standard than reasonable suspicion and that, as a result, the trial court’s error tended to benefit defendant.

Moreover,”there is sound authority to the effect that where the court below has reached the correct result, the judgment may be affirmed even though the theory on which the result is bottomed is erroneous.” Dobias v. White, 240 N.C. 680, 688, 83 S.E.2d 785, 790 (1954). “If the correct result has been reached, the judgment will not be disturbed even though the trial court may not have assigned the correct reason for the judgment entered.” Shore v. Brown, 324 N.C. 427, 428, 378 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1989) (citations omitted).

We conclude that the undisputed facts and circumstances known to Officer Griess support the conclusion that the law enforcement officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop of defendant’s car, and that the trial court’s findings of fact support this conclusion as well. As discussed above, defendant has not offered any appellate argument challenging the evidentiary basis for a conclusion that reasonable suspicion existed. Defendant asserts that the court’s findings of fact are insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, and cites State v. Murray, 192 N.C. App. 684, 666 S.E.2d 205 (2008). In Murray, however, the law enforcement officer who stopped the defendant admitted that he had not observed the defendant violate any traffic laws, and that the officer had “no reason to believe” that the defendant was engaged in any illegal activity. Murray, 192 N.C. App. at 688, 666 S.E.2d at 208. In the present case, Officer Griess observed defendant stop his vehicle in a lane of travel of a busy highway, which is both a violation of traffic regulations and a safety hazard. The officer also saw a pedestrian approach defendant’s car and lean in the window and, as previously discussed, these events occurred at 4:00 a.m. in an area known for illegal drug sales. We conclude that Murray is factually distinguishable from the present case and does not require reversal of the trial court’s denial of defendant’s suppression motion.

For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges against him for violation of his right to a speedy trial, or by denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized at the time of his arrest. Given that defendant has raised no other challenges to his convictions, we conclude that defendant had a fair trial, free of reversible error.

Note: This is a court with foresight. But deciding the merits on a clear record, they cut off a post-conviction IAC argument, albeit one that would have failed.