Plaintiff led officers on a high-speed chase on a motorcycle through two counties, at times reaching 110 mph. In a city, “[i]ndeed, the video shows that he covered the 4.8 miles between the intersections of Z-Horse Charters and South East Avenue B in just 3 minutes and 3 seconds—at a blur-inducing average speed of 94.43 mph.” He crashed and sued the officers for chasing him and lost. Willis v. Mock, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 1231 (11th Cir. January 27, 2015):
1.
Outside of the Fourth Amendment “search” or “seizure” context, the Supreme Court has recognized that an excessive-force claim may be based on substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843-45, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1715-16 (1998). This protection, however, shields individuals from only arbitrary and oppressive uses of force. Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1271 (11th Cir. 2003). Put simply, “only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense.'” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846, 118 S. Ct. at 1716 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1071 (1991)). For this reason, the standard governing Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force claims is “shocks the conscience.” Id., 118 S. Ct. at 1717. “The standard for showing excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, is higher than that required to show excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Fennell v. Gilstrap, 559 F.3d 1212, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009).
The Supreme Court has indicated that “conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level.” Lewis, 523 at 849, 118 S. Ct. at 1718 (emphasis added); see also Carr, 338 F.3d at 1271. If the conduct was “malicious[ ] and sadistic[ ]” and done “for the very purpose of causing harm,” Cockwell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 1085 (1986) (internal quotation mark omitted)), then it “necessarily shocks the conscience,” id. Otherwise, it does not.
2.
We agree with the district court’s finding that Willis’s Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force claim fails because he “presented no evidence to suggest that the actions of [Deputies] Brannon and Cook were motivated by anything other than the desire to stop [his] reckless driving, his high-speed flight from police, and his concomitant endangerment of the motoring public.” Doc. 52 at 11.
On appeal, Willis does not even address how Deputy Brannon allegedly violated his constitutional rights; instead, he focuses on Deputy Cook’s actions. According to Willis, Deputy Cook, while safely behind his patrol car, which was parked in the middle of the road to create a roadblock, fired two shots at him as he was slowing down and preparing to stop at the roadblock. Willis declares that this conduct satisfies Lewis’s shock-the-conscience test because it was done to cause him harm rather than to serve a legitimate law-enforcement purpose.
But Willis’s declarations, no matter how adamant, are not a substitute for evidence. More importantly, even if Deputy Cook fired his shotgun at him, the use of deadly force does not necessarily satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s excessive-force standard, see Scott, 550 U.S. at 383, 127 S. Ct. at 1778, much less the more stringent standard under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Fennell, 559 F.3d at 1217.
Finally, Willis offers no evidence suggesting that Deputy Cook’s actions were motivated by anything other than the law-enforcement purpose of ending Willis’s dangerous, high-speed ride. See Vaughan, 343 F.3d at 1333.
At bottom, even when Willis’s evidence is credited and reasonable inferences therefrom are drawn in his favor, no reasonable jury could conclude that Deputies Brannon and Cook violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to them will be affirmed.
