CA8: Stop of the wrong person on reasonable but mistaken belief not suppressed

Based on an informant’s story, the police were looking for Barefield in a particular car. They happened upon defendant Patrick at the appointed time and place near the informant in a car matching the description. A reasonable but mistaken belief that defendant and his car were the ones described by the informant here added up to even probable cause for the stop. United States v. Patrick, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 1003 (8th Cir. January 23, 2015):

In United States v. Bobo, 994 F.2d 524 (8th Cir. 1993), we confronted a similar situation. Police were searching for a Mr. Bobo with the alias “Hanky,” who was suspected of homicide. Id. at 525. Having narrowed their search to Richard Bobo and Marvin Bobo (brothers), police suspected Marvin. See id. at 525-26. With a “pickup order” for Marvin, one officer began searching for a large green Cadillac in “beat-up condition,” which eyewitness testimony tied to Marvin. Id. at 526. While on patrol, the officer happened upon “a green Cadillac in poor condition” driven by a man whom he “thought … closely resembled the mug shot of Marvin.” Id. Officers pulled over the Cadillac (after a brief chase), noticing the driver “duck[] to his right and … reach under the driver’s seat.” Id. Officers arrested the man and found a firearm under his seat, but they soon realized the driver was Marvin’s brother Richard, who also happened to be a felon. See id. Although Richard argued the arrest based on the mistaken identity was unlawful, we “note[d] that if the police had probable cause to arrest Marvin, and they reasonably believed that the man driving the green Cadillac was Marvin, then Richard’s arrest was a valid arrest.” Id. at 527. Because (1) the officers had good reason to suspect Marvin, (2) Richard resembled Marvin, and (3) Richard was driving a car tied to Marvin, we concluded police had probable cause to arrest Richard. See id.

As with the Bobo brothers, the officers here had probable cause to suspect Barefield of a crime, and they reasonably believed the man driving the gold-brown Buick was Barefield. One of Agent Oliver’s known informants mistakenly had identified the driver as Barefield. Although we do not know the informant’s past reliability, he was known to Agent Oliver and was “enlisted … to be a confidential informant, and therefore, could be held accountable … for false information.” United States v. Kent, 531 F.3d 642, 649 (8th Cir. 2008). The informant’s willingness to arrange a meeting and his accurate prediction of events also provided strong support to the veracity of the informant’s information. See United States v. Winarske, 715 F.3d 1063, 1067 (8th Cir. 2013) (“An informant may … prove himself to be a reliable source for law enforcement by providing predictive information about a meeting time or place.”); United States v. Manes, 603 F.3d 451, 456 (8th Cir. 2010) (reasoning the reliability of an informant’s information “is bolstered if the tip is corroborated not only by matching an identity or description, but also by accurately describing a suspect’s future behavior”). In this case, the time and location of the meeting place, the color of the car, the dent in its passenger-side door, and even the car’s make3 all point to the informant’s accuracy and truthfulness with regard to the driver’s identity.

Even disregarding the mistaken identity, the informant told the officers that whoever the driver was, he would have drugs on him. This information, combined with the informant’s corroborated credibility, also justified a reasonable belief the driver had committed a crime.

At the time Officer Gann made the stop, reasonable suspicion and even probable cause existed to believe the driver had committed a crime. This is more than enough to justify a stop. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause.”).