WaPo: How officers used new ICE memo to forcefully enter a Minneapolis home

WaPo: How officers used new ICE memo to forcefully enter a Minneapolis home by Arelis R. Hernández (“With long guns pointed in her direction, Teyana Gibson repeatedly demanded that federal immigration officers show her a warrant as she stood between them and her immigrant husband inside her Minneapolis house. ‘What are you doing?’ she yelled, as the officers burst through the front door with a battering ram, according to a cellphone recording of the chaotic encounter on Jan. 11. Officers handcuffed Garrison Gibson — a Liberian national who for years had reported for regular check-ins with Immigration and Customs Enforcement — and took him away in a government vehicle. Then they handed Teyana Gibson, who is a U.S. citizen, a photocopy of a document that purported to give them the legal authority to enter and search her home without consent. But it was not a judicial warrant authorized by a federal judge — rather, the document was an administrative warrant signed by an ICE supervisor, according to court documents.”).

All things considered, what happens when they argue the good faith exception? The good faith exception requires a judicial warrant. Remember Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971)? There the warrant was issued by the Attorney General, not a neutral and detached magistrate within the judicial process:

The classic statement of the policy underlying the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is that of Mr. Justice Jackson, writing for the Court in Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14:

The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate, instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity, and leave the people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police officers …. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.

Johnson was 1948.