Police direction to a protestor to move to another side of the street is not a seizure

Plaintiff was involved in an animal rights protest, and a police officer ordered him to move to the other side of the street. This was not a seizure. Deardorff v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov’t, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78235 (W.D. Ky. October 20, 2006):

Count III of Deardorff’s complaint, which alleges that he was unreasonably and unconstitutionally seized when he submitted to Baker’s order to cross to the east side of Blakenbaker, must also be dismissed. The Fourth Amendment protects the right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, “a person is ‘seized’ only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained. … As long as the person remains free to … walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some particularized and objective justification.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 S.Ct. 1870-1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). Nowhere has Deardorff alleged that Baker somehow impeded his ability to leave the area. On the contrary, Deardorff was always free to leave, but chose to remain and protest on the east side of Blakenbaker to avoid potentially violating the law.

Defendant’s wife suspected him of having an affair, so she searched through his belongings and found child porn video and computer images of their granddaughter and grandniece. She turned them over the police who also viewed them. This was a private search that was used to get a search warrant. Bruce v. State, 2006 Ark. LEXIS 535 (October 26, 2006).

During routine traffic stop, defendant kept putting his hands in his pockets [a sign of nervousness, perhaps?], and that justified a patdown for weapons. The evidence supports the District Court’s finding that the stop was not unnecessarily extended. United States v. Chavarria, 202 Fed. Appx. 310 (10th Cir. October 26, 2006)* (unpublished).

Defendant’s own actions in removing marijuana from his sock during a search of his person factored into District Court’s determination that he considered the sock to be within the scope of consent. United States v. Richardson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78334 (D. Neb. October 23, 2006):

It is undisputed that Richardson was of adequate age and intelligence, and was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol during his encounter with the police on February 17, 2006. (Filing No. 29, 4). Richardson consented to the search after being questioned only briefly, and although he argues in his brief that he was physically threatened, there is nothing on the record to verify that assertion. Rather, the record is completely devoid of any threats, physical intimidation, or punishment prior to Richardson’s consent. Further, when Richardson consented, he was standing on a terminal platform, outside, in a public place. There is no evidence of misrepresentation by Investigator Lutter in gaining Richardson’s consent, and no evidence that Richardson was in custody at the time he consented. Finally, although there is some evidence of limited consent–testimony that Richardson stepped back when Investigator Lutter reached for his left sock a second time–the fact that Richardson then reached into his own sock, withdrew the marijuana, and handed it to Investigator Lutter demonstrates the scope of the search at least included examination of the marijuana.