CA sexual violent predators stated claims for relief for unreasonable searches by staff; not all Fourth Amendment rights of incarcerated persons are lost

October 2: I’m in the Edomonton Airport, surprised that my Sprint card works here, even though tenuously. Been on the road doing a CLE. I won’t have enough time at the connection to sign on again. When I get home, I’ll be a grandfather again, so postings today will be sporadic as I get caught up.

Treatment claim of 600 class members of sexually violent predators in California institution stated a claim for relief under § 1983 under the Fourth Amendment (many other issues addressed, too). Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. September 28, 2006):

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ policies and practices subject Plaintiffs to unreasonable searches, seizures, and unnecessary use of force. According to Plaintiffs, they are subjected to public strip searches; to retaliatory searches of their possessions; and to arbitrary seizure of their personal belongings upon arrival at Atascadero. SVPs are also placed in shackles during transport to Atascadero and during visits from family and friends. When they refuse to participate in treatment, they are subjected to “red light alarms” even if they do not post any physical risk. Moreover, they are force-medicated as a means of intimidation and punishment, and for the convenience of staff.

Accepting these allegations as true, we believe Plaintiffs may be able to state a “clearly established” violation of their Fourth Amendment rights, and thus, the claims are not appropriate for dismissal at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. The watchword of the Fourth Amendment in every context is reasonableness. As this court held in Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694 (9th Cir. 1997), “the Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures ‘extends to incarcerated prisoners.'” Id. at 699. Thus, this protection certainly extends to SVPs.

Of course, “the reasonableness of a particular search [or seizure] is determined by reference to the [detention] context.” Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1988). As with any detained person, there are concerns that mirror those that arise in the prison context: i.e., “the safety and security of guards and others in the facility, order within the facility and the efficiency of the facility’s operations.” Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1061 (8th Cir. 2001). But even so, qualified immunity does not protect a search or seizure that is arbitrary, retaliatory, or clearly exceeds the legitimate purpose of detention.

Under this framework, we cannot dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim at this stage. The “reasonableness” of a search or seizure is a fact-intensive inquiry that cannot be determined at this stage. See, e.g., Thompson, 111 F.3d 694 (9th Cir. 1997) (evaluating the reasonableness of a strip search based on the manner and scope of the search, the place, and the justification). It is impossible to make such a fact-specific determination when the precise circumstances of the searches or seizures are not before the court and when the Defendants have not yet had a chance to explain their justification for the alleged searches or seizures. We cannot say, then, that Plaintiffs cannot possibly state a “clearly established violation” based on any facts consistent with their pleadings. n12 Therefore, Defendants do not have a right to qualified immunity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Officers came to plaintiffs’ house on a 911 call and became concerned that one plaintiff was mentally unbalanced, and they requested access to all guns in the house. The plaintiff wife acceded to that. She did not state a Fourth Amendment claim that she was seized although she was taking the police to where the guns were in the house at their request. Snider v. Lincoln County Bd. Of County Comm’rs, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70057 (W.D. Okla. September 27, 2006).*