W.D.N.Y.: Likelihood of suppression isn’t a factor at detention hearing

Defendant’s assertion at a detention hearing that there is some “likelihood” he may win suppression of evidence isn’t a factor in the decision to release. He’s still entitled to the presumption of innocence, but, essentially, exclusion isn’t ever likely enough to factor in to the release decision. United States v. Cordero, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210399 (W.D. N.Y. Nov. 10, 2020):

While defendant Cordero suggests that the evidence of his dangerousness to the community is likely to be suppressed for a bad faith violation of the Fourth Amendment, it bears emphasis that the Court’s assessment of the danger he poses is not an assessment of the likelihood of his being convicted and punished during a trial. The defendant is presumed innocent. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(j). The Court’s practical assessment of his dangerousness pursuant to § 3142(e) serves the compelling regulatory purpose of determining whether his is one of the few serious cases where detention is necessary to protect the public or individuals from future crime that he may commit while on release. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747-48 (1987). Given this context, the Court finds the defendant’s suggestion that the evidence against him will be suppressed in order to deter future police misconduct has little merit. See e.g., United States v. Barner, 743 F. Supp. 2d 225, 230 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Some courts have held that evidence which is being suppressed for purposes of trial may nevertheless be considered in evaluating the ‘weight of the evidence’ factor under § 3142(g).”) The defendant is subject to three statutory presumptions of dangerousness because of his serious criminal record and because of the serious criminal offenses with which he has been charged by a Grand Jury. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(2), (e)(3)(A) and (e)(3)(B). Because he has not been able to rebut the statutory presumptions of danger to the community, and because the Court finds by a standard of clear and convincing evidence that the available conditions of release will not adequately protect the community, he must remain in pretrial detention pending his trial.

This entry was posted in Exclusionary rule. Bookmark the permalink.

Comments are closed.