Fourth Amendment claim stated by City’s issuance of erroneous map that allowed trespassing on plaintiff’s land

Plaintiff stated a Fourth Amendment claim from the City’s issuance of an erroneous map that cut off a piece of plaintiff’s land and allowed trespassers to enter land. The City was told of the mistake and refused to act. Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480 (4th Cir. September 22, 2006):

In fact, the Supreme Court has held that a seizure of property occurs whenever “there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984). Presley has alleged an “interference with” her “possessory interests” that is clearly “meaningful”; indeed, this interference has assertedly been disruptive, stressful, and invasive. Her complaint states that she has been deprived of the use of part of her property due to the regular presence of a veritable army of trespassers who freely and regularly traverse her yard, littering, making noise, damaging her land, and occasionally even camping overnight. This constant physical occupation certainly constitutes a “meaningful interference” with Presley’s “possessory interests” in her property.

Of course, it is private individuals, not City officials, who have actually interfered with Presley’s possessory interests here. Although private actions generally do not implicate the Fourth Amendment, when a private person acts “as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official,” then the private person’s acts are attributed to the government. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (internal quotation marks omitted). The government need not compel nor even involve itself directly in the private person’s actions. For example, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614-15, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989), the Supreme Court held that “breath and urine tests required by private railroads” implicated the Fourth Amendment when the railroads voluntarily complied with federal regulations governing such tests.

Defendant was arrested without probable cause and sweated for a confession. The case was virtually indistinguishable from Dunaway and Knaupp, and confession suppressed. United States v. Shaw, 464 F.3d 615 (6th Cir. September 26, 2006).*

NM regulatory scheme for trucks satisfied Burger, and the search scheme as a whole is subject to review, not just the search at issue. United States v. Gwathney, 465 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. September 26, 2006):

“The Burger criteria apply to a regulatory scheme generally, not to the particular search at issue.” United States v. Maldonado, 356 F.3d 130, 136 (1st Cir. 2004). “In other words, the Burger criteria are applied generally to a statutory scheme, not to a given set of facts arising under that scheme.’ Id.

Reasonable suspicion for a drug test by a transit authority required under the union contract is a contract issue, not a Fourth Amendment claim. Harris v. SEPTA, 205 Fed. Appx. 39 (3d Cir. 2006)* (unpublished), following Dykes v. SEPTA, 68 F.3d 1564 (3d Cir. 1995).