3d Cir.: Whren does not alter RS standard

Whren does not alter the reasonable suspicion standard; it merely explains it. United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. September 22, 2006):

While this court has not directly addressed the question whether Whren has changed the law of traffic stops, we find persuasive the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Lopez-Soto. As discussed in that opinion, there is little in Whren to suggest that the Court meant to create a new probable cause standard in the context of investigatory traffic stops. Instead, the Court in Whren was responding to the situation before it — one in which the officer obviously possessed probable cause. Indeed, though the Court has never explicitly returned to the question post-Whren, the Court has later made mention of brief, investigatory stops of “persons or vehicles” in the context of reasonable suspicion. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). This lends support to our understanding that Whren was not conceived as altering the longstanding reasonable suspicion standard recognized in the traffic-stop setting. Thus, we now join our sister circuits in holding that the Terry reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops.

The Fourth Amendment applies to entry on to real property. Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 24048 (4th Cir. September 22, 2006):

The Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable seizures clearly extend to real property. See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 52 (1993) (noting that the Fourth Amendment applies to the seizure of a four-acre parcel of land with a house); Freeman v. City of Dallas, 242 F.3d 642, 647 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“[T]he City seized the Freemans’ real property for demolition.”). Nevertheless, the district court held that Presley had failed to allege a Fourth Amendment violation. The court offered two grounds for its holding; we find neither persuasive.

In NY, a “no bill” from a grand jury is not a finding of no probable cause. Houghton v. Culver, 452 F. Supp. 2d 212 (W.D. N.Y. September 21, 2006):

I note that the fact that the grand jury returned a “no bill” is not dispositive of the issue of whether defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff. See Phillips v. Corbin, 132 F.3d 867, 869 (2d Cir. 1998) (“the grand jury’s refusal to indict Phillips does not, as a matter of law, establish that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest her”); Vonritter v. Town of Bethel, Connecticut, No. 91-CV-612, 1993 WL 83291, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar.15, 1993) (finding existence of probable cause to arrest although three months later the grand jury returned a “no bill”).