8th Cir. stretchs to find exigent circumstances to support an entry

Three officers went to defendant’s house to check out a stolen vehicle report. They had also heard that defendant had been moving stolen property from the vehicle to the house. The court found no consent to the officer’s barging into the house, but it found exigent circumstances from the fact that contraband was likely being moved into the house. The court found that exigent circumstances supported the officer’s entry into the residence notwithstanding the fact that the other two officers were unsuccessful in their attempt to convey their knowledge that defendant possessed a firearm to the one inside. Under the circumstances, the officer was reasonably and legitimately concerned for his own safety as well as the safety of the neighbors. Because the firearm was in plain view, it was properly seized. United States v. Poe, 462 F.3d 997 (8th Cir. September 19, 2006). Comment: This raises the “collective knowledge” doctrine to a new level. An officer makes what would be an illegal entry, but it is saved because another officer not inside has knowledge that the officer inside does not have. Again, see the Eighth Circuit’s local unwritten rule.

“A warrant authorized a search of defendant’s residence for guns, ammunition, footwear, clothing, and any other related fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of the crime. During the search, officers discovered a pipe bomb in a hidden compartment, which contained ammunition, and other items related to making a pipe bomb in plain view. The trial court ruled that severance was applicable and ordered partial suppression, upholding the seizure of a gun and ammunition and other items pursuant to the plain view doctrine. The court held that severance of the warrant and partial suppression was appropriate. There was no probable cause for a search for footwear or clothing. The firearms and ammunition provisions were distinguishable from the other portions and were the main subject of the warrant, and thus the valid portions of the warrant made up the greater part of the warrant. Total suppression was not required where there was no indiscriminate rummaging or hours of ransacking, or any suggestion that the officers’ actions constituted flagrant disregard for the Fourth Amendment or the permissible scope, duration, and intensity of the search under the redacted warrant. [Lexis overview]” United States v. Sells, 463 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. September 19, 2006).

Hudson applied to prevent exclusion for an alleged knock and announce violation. Also, trash left out for collection was subject to seizure by the police. United States v. Kearns, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66389 (N.D. Ga. September 15, 2006).*

Officers could seize a safe for which they had PC to believe contained evidence of a crime for the 38 hours it took to get a search warrant. The defendant’s privacy interest in the safe was not interfered with by taking it as opposed to having an officer stand guard in his house. United States v. Cone, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66464 (D. Me. September 15, 2006).

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