Oregon holds that running “wants and warrants” on a mere passenger during a stop violates state constitution

Under Oregon statute, officers lack the authority to run wants and warrants on a passenger during a traffic stop. The statute, however, does not provide a suppression remedy. Turning to the state constitution, the court finds that it was violated. The Oregon constitution is not based on a deterrence rationale like the Fourth Amendment. Instead, it vindicates personal rights. State v. Thompkin, 341 Ore. 368, 143 P.3d 530 (September 14, 2006):

The facts at issue here are similar to those in Hall. Here, one officer (Hill) requested and retained defendant’s identification to conduct a records check, including a check for outstanding warrants. While awaiting the results of that check, another officer (Reagan) questioned defendant concerning drugs and weapons, which prompted defendant to surrender the crack pipe. Here, as in Hall, we find it doubtful that a reasonable person in defendant’s position would think that he or she was free to leave at a time when that person was the investigatory subject of a pending warrant check and was being questioned about illegal activity. See id. at 19 (so stating). In view of those facts, defendant was unlawfully seized under Article I, section 9, because her liberty of movement was significantly restrained under the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Painter, 296 Ore. 422, 425, 676 P.2d 309 (1984) (holding that officer’s action of retaining defendant’s identification cards constituted seizure because it had practical effect of making defendant unable to leave).

Having concluded that defendant was unlawfully “seized” for purposes of Article I, section 9, we must next determine whether suppression of the evidence obtained during that illegality is required. As noted above, the trial court concluded that defendant had voluntarily surrendered the crack pipe in response to Reagan’s questioning. Again, Hall is the guiding precedent on this issue. In Hall, this court reiterated that the Oregon exclusionary rule is not predicated upon a deterrence rationale like its Fourth Amendment counterpart, but is a “constitutionally mandated rule that serves to vindicate a defendant’s personal rights.” 339 Ore. at 24. See State v. Davis, 313 Ore. 246, 249, 834 P.2d 1008 (1992) (holding that protection against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article I, section 9, includes right “to be free from the use of evidence that has been obtained in violation of the defendant’s rights prescribed by that provision”). “Thus, in deciding the applicability of the Oregon exclusionary rule, the critical inquiry is whether the state obtained the evidence sought to be suppressed as a result of a violation of the defendant’s rights under Article I, section 9.” Hall, 339 Ore. at 24.