8th Cir. holds that a lie and RS about possession of cash supports forfeiture

I should read cases from my own circuit, but I don’t regularly do so. This was sent to me by a reader.

On Thursday, a panel held 2-1 that the claimant’s flimsy explanations of possession of that much cash justified a forfeiture for what reads like reasonable suspicion of possession of too much cash. United States v. $124,700 in U.S. Currency, 05-3295 (8th Cir. August 18, 2006):

The route and circumstances of Gonzolez’s travel were highly suspicious. Gonzolez had flown on a one-way ticket, which we have previously acknowledged is evidence in favor of forfeiture, see United States v. U.S. Currency in the Amount of $150,660.00, 980 F.2d 1200, 1206 (8th Cir. 1992), and he gave a vague explanation, attributed to advice from an unidentified third person, about why he elected to return by car. Gonzolez purportedly carried $125,000 in cash with him on his flight, for the purpose of buying a truck that he had never seen, from a third party whom he had never met, with the help of a friend whose name he could not recall at trial. This testimony does not inspire confidence in the innocence of the conduct. When he was stopped by the Nebraska State Patrol, Gonzolez was driving a rental car that was leased in the name of another person who was not present, another circumstance that gives rise to suspicion. Then, when Gonzolez was questioned by officers, he lied about having money in the car and about the names of his friends, thus giving further reason to question the legitimacy of the currency’s presence. See $117,920.00 in U.S. Currency, 413 F.3d at 829. The totality of these circumstances–the large amount of concealed currency, the strange travel pattern, the inability to identify a key party in the purported innocent transaction, the unusual rental car papers, the canine alert, and the false statements to law enforcement officers-–leads most naturally to the inference that Gonzolez was involved in illegal drug activity, and that the currency was substantially connected to it.

A completely innocent person would likely lie about having that much cash in the car because it is none of the officer’s business. The fear of theft of the money can apply to police officers as well. (Sheriff’s deputies with a DTF were convicted in my federal district for stealing money from an FBI bait car.)

The District Court also found that a drug dog’s alert on the money had only slight probative value, citing Eighth Circuit opinions in accord. The Eighth Circuit panel rejected the government’s effort to reverse on that ground as well:

The government argues that the district court erred by according only “slight” probative value to the canine alert. That precise language, however, was drawn from one of our decisions, see $84,615 in U.S. Currency, 379 F.3d at 502, and the government in this case presented no expert testimony or other scientific evidence that might warrant a stronger inference. Cf. United States v. Funds in the Amount of $30,670, 403 F.3d 448, 457-59 (7th Cir. 2005). The significance of canine alerts is largely a scientific question, and absent a developed record, we decline to expand on our previous pronouncements in this area.

Even more profoundly surprising is the fact that the claimant was prosecuted for nothing.